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Nonprofit Takeovers:
Regulating the Market for Mission Control
Dana Brakman Reiser*
I. INTRODUCTION

A corporation that has long pursued a particular set of policies
and programs is undergoing a struggle for control of its activities
and, ultimately, its funds. Although in the past, incumbent board
members have been reelected with little or no opposition, this year's
election is different. Newcomers are running for the board on a
platform that argues the incumbent board has not been sufficiently
aggressive. Further, the newcomers claim that, if elected, they will
improve the corporation by changing its methods and refocusing its
mission, thereby achieving greater success. The newcomers also have
been gaining voting power, buying up rights to vote in the
upcoming elections. In response, the incumbents rush to portray the
newcomers as dangerous insurgents who threaten the august
reputation of the corporation, as well as its future prosperity. The
parties ultimately end up in litigation over the methods the
newcomers may use to garner control and those the incumbents may
use to defend against the newcomers. In resolving these issues, the
court intones a standard quite protective of the incumbents'
position.
In reading this plot sketch, one might guess the particulars of
this story relate to a transaction in the familiar for-profit market for
corporate control. The board of a blue-chip for-profit corporate
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research
Program, the Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the BLS Faculty and Junior Faculty
Workshops, and the able research assistance of Mason Allen, Libby Bakalar, Matthew Kelly,
and Jennifer McGovern. I appreciate the comments of Jeff Reiser, Putnam Barber, Evelyn
Brody, Michael Cahill, Ed Cheng, Steven Dean, James Fishman, Marion Fremont-Smith,
Ronald Gilson, Sally Gordon, Susan Herman, Jason Johnston, Roberta Karmel, Robert A.
Katz, Claire Kelly, Heidi Kitrosser, Debra Morris, Arthur Pinto, Jack Preis, David Reiss, Jayne
Ressler, Anthony Sebok, Chris Serkin, Larry Solan, Madhavi Sunder, Daniel Tinkelman, Mark
Tushnet, and the attendees at the 2005 ARNOVA panel at which I presented an earlier draft.
Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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giant is accused of stagnation in a proxy contest, tender offer, or
both, and seeks refuge for its defenses within the relatively generous
standards articulated in the Delaware courts' takeover defense
jurisprudence. It may come as more of a surprise, however, that this
story also provides the contours of a struggle for control that can and
has occurred within nonprofit institutions. Furthermore, upon closer
inspection, one observes that courts have been even more deferential
in sheltering the defensive actions of incumbent nonprofit directors
than they have of their for-profit counterparts.
This Article relates the tales of two such recent takeover attempts
at the Sierra Club ("the Club") and the Royal Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA or "the Society"). These
examples demonstrate how nonprofit takeover attempts can be
mounted. They also offer a glimpse at the courts' extremely
deferential response to nonprofit incumbents facing takeovers.
Ultimately, this Article argues that this stance is at odds with both
the basic structures of governance these nonprofits have chosen and
with some of the fundamental notions of how charity benefits our
society.
Part II begins by offering initial insights into the concerns that
takeover activity raises, both within targeted nonprofits and for
society at large. After identifying these concerns, it then takes a step
back to place nonprofit takeovers within the context of the various
transactions by which nonprofit organizations can experience
changes in control. This treatment reveals that the nonprofit
transactional menu has somewhat different offerings than its forprofit analogue, particularly in the hostile transaction category.
Mergers and purchases mediated through fiduciaries are available, as
in for-profits. However, at least in those nonprofits with memberelected boards, changes in control also can be achieved by
persuading existing members to vote in a new control group and
often by the purchase of sufficient new memberships to outvote any
opposition to an insurgency. Existing literature has considered
friendly control transactions in the nonprofit sector but has not yet
grappled with the theory and implications of hostile attempts at
nonprofit takeovers, as this Article does. Cataloguing the range of
transactions available to shift control of nonprofits sets the stage for
an examination of these efforts in action, as well as an analysis and
critique of fiduciaries' and courts' reactions to them.
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Part III presents two recent real-world examples of nonprofit
takeover attempts. These case studies offer a view of takeover activity
at different stages and using distinct techniques. At the Sierra Club,
members in favor of adding an anti-immigration plank to the Club's
platform sought election to its board in order to see their goal
implemented. Pro-hunting insurgents within the RSPCA engaged in
a campaign to recruit new members and to mobilize them to push
withdrawal of the Society's support for nationwide anti-hunting
legislation. Despite these somewhat different strategies, the stories
share a common reaction by the fiduciaries of the target nonprofits.
Both sought to defend themselves and their organizations against
what they perceived and decried as a wrongful attempt by insurgents
to destroy their nonprofit organization and defeat its mission.
Moreover, when challenged, the defensive measures taken by both
sets of fiduciaries were met with considerable deference by reviewing
courts.
Such a deferential, incumbent-protective standard of review is, of
course, not the only alternative available to courts reviewing defenses
deployed by nonprofit fiduciaries against takeover attempts or
preparations. Part IV considers a variety of standards among which
reviewing courts might choose, including incumbent-protective
options like those used in Sierra Club and RSPCA, insurgentprotective standards that would enable most takeover activity and
frustrate defending fiduciaries, and intermediate standards that
would seek to distinguish destructive from healthy nonprofit
takeover activity. Ultimately, this Article argues for an intermediate
approach designed specifically for the nonprofit context in which
these transactions take place.
The scrutiny courts apply to review defensive measures against
nonprofit takeover activity should turn on the techniques employed
by insurgents. Fiduciaries' attempts to frustrate insurgents seeking to
persuade members-another governing constituency of the
organization-that their plans are superior to those of incumbents
should be reviewed rigorously. In contrast, when fiduciaries act to
prevent the dilution or evasion of members' role in defining the
organization's mission and activities, their defensive actions should
be subject to more deferential review. This governance-protective
standard would balance the nonprofit sector's rectitude for
preserving original intent and mission and the value in allowing
nonprofit mission to evolve in order to meet society's changing
1183
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needs. It also would reinforce the choice that nonprofits with voting
members have made to use democratic governance processes.
Part V offers concluding thoughts on the larger lessons the
limited phenomenon of nonprofit takeovers may teach. In particular,
crafting a response to these high stakes conflicts reminds us of the
crucial importance of mission in nonprofits and the challenges of
defining and policing that mission in organizations with multiple
stakeholders.

II. NONPROFIT TAKEOVER ACTIVITY EXPLAINED
Control of a for-profit corporation may be shifted via a spectrum
of friendly to hostile transactions, and the relevant parties to these
deals are well-understood and denominated. Further, the context in
which these transactions take place can and has been explained as a
functioning market for corporate control. Part II.B will use these forprofit terms and concepts to serve as a starting point for a catalogue
of similarly friendly-to-hostile transactions that can be used to
acquire control of a nonprofit corporation, the parties involved in
them, and the context in which they operate. With this initiation,
Part II.C will then explore in more detail the particular concern of
this Article: the types of hostile transactions available to shift control
in nonprofit corporations with member-elected fiduciaries.
Before turning to this transactional taxonomy, however, it is
important to convey the gravity of the dangers nonprofit takeovers
may pose to affected organizations, the nonprofit sector, and society
at large. Although Part II.C will provide an accurate explanation of
the means by which nonprofit takeover attempts may be mounted,
its description is too abstract to communicate a sense of the real fears
experienced by those at the helm of a targeted organization.
Therefore, Part II.A offers some preliminary insights into the stakes
of these conflicts, both for the targeted nonprofits and more
generally.
A. The PotentialPerilsof Nonprofit Takeovers
As an initial matter, takeover activity within a nonprofit raises
grave concerns for its leaders. These fears can go far deeper than
superficial worries that they may be replaced. Directors, officers, and
managers of a targeted nonprofit often will be genuinely afraid that
their organization's mission will be impaired, if not betrayed, by a
1184
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takeover.1 They do not see the insurgent individual, entity, or group
as merely a potential investor in a market for mission control. Rather,
they see the insurgents as dangerous ideological interlopers, intent
on co-opting the nonprofit's resources, name, and reputation for
purposes inimical to it. Moreover, the fact that a takeover may be a
means by which to transform a nonprofit's mission illegitimately
poses a significant risk beyond the bounds of the affected
organization. It also raises concerns for the nonprofit sector's role in
society. In order to understand nonprofit takeover phenomena and
propose schemes for their regulation, it is critical to understand the
seriousness of these potential perils.
Fiduciaries of a nonprofit faced with takeover activity view
insurgents as desiring to transform their organization's mission
illegitimately. The clearest, legally-binding statement of a nonprofit's
mission can be found in the statement of purposes in its corporate
charter.2 Barring amendment of these purposes, any new control
group can only make programmatic and policy changes only within
the range of this mission. Thus, an insurgent group mounting
takeover efforts or preparations generally can explain its plans as
furthering the mission the nonprofit states in its charter.3 This
limitation often will be of little comfort to incumbents facing
takeover activity, however, as the expressions of mission in corporate
charters are typically quite broad. The sense of the nonprofit's
appropriate mission espoused by its leaders will be more specific,
shaped by the history of the organization, the trend in its policies
and activities, and the plans and strategies its fiduciaries have laid out
for it over time. Despite insurgents' ability to frame their plans for
1. Of course, leaders of a for-profit corporation might view the threat of a takeover in
similar terms. They may view the goals of their organization more holistically than merely
maximizing the bottom line and may fear the possibility that a takeover will betray their
company's goodwill or corporate values. I thank Roberta Karmel for this insight.
2. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5306(a) (2005) ("Articles of incorporation ... shall
set forth . . . [a] brief statement of the purpose or purposes for which the corporation is
incorporated."); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.03.025 (2005) ("The articles of incorporation shall
set forth . . . [t]he purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized."); REVISED
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(b) (1987) ("The articles of incorporation may set
forth ... the purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized .... ).
3. It is also possible that an insurgent group would mount its takeover bid in tandem
with a proposal to amend the charter's statement of purposes. However, statements of
purposes are usually sufficiently general that this will not be necessary. Such a strategy also
would increase the risk of triggering review of the use of prior-acquired assets, a risk insurgents
likely would desire to avoid. See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
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the nonprofit as within the technical terms of the charter, incumbent
leaders may view these plans as a serious compromise of the
organization's true mission-one that they have seen evolve
firsthand.
These concerns about compromising the organization's true
mission range from the pragmatic to the philosophical. On the most
practical level, incumbents may fear that after a takeover, resources of
the organization will be used by insurgents to advance goals different
from, or even adverse to, the goals for which those resources were
originally earned or donated. Such a change in asset use will deprive
the nonprofit's original goals of needed funding and may irk past
and discourage future donors. To some degree, this fear is an
overreaction, as prior-acquired tangible assets may be safeguarded by
legal limitations on changes in their use.4 The name and goodwill of
the organization, however, likely will not be. The nonprofit
corporation is granted perpetual existence, with its purposes to be
advanced in the ways directed by its fiduciaries. The value inherent in
a respected nonprofit's reputation will be at the disposal of any
validly selected new board-and this value may be substantial. If the
target nonprofit's incumbents believe the programmatic or policy
changes advocated by insurgents are in conflict with its mission, they
have real reason to fear the appropriation of their nonprofit's name
and reputation by insurgents. Finally, as the most identifiable leaders
of their nonprofit organization, nonprofit fiduciaries may feel
personal responsibility to protect the ideological territory the group
has staked out for itself, and insurgents' plans may threaten the
ability of the nonprofit to play this role.
In addition to the fears that takeover activity can provoke within
individual nonprofits, if it functions as a vehicle for illegitimate
transformation of mission, this phenomenon raises sector- and
society-wide concerns as well. The crux of these concerns is, of
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003) ("A disposition to [a
charitable] institution for a specific purpose . . . creates a charitable trust of which the
institution is the trustee for purposes of the terminology and rules of this Restatement."); see
also Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing To Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor
Enforcement, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1106-08 (2005) (noting that even unrestricted gifts are
to be used for "purpose[s] consistent with the charity's mission" and that restrictions on
charitable gifts generally last in perpetuity); Evelyn Brody, The Legal Framework for Restricted
Gifts: The Cy Pres Doctrine and Corporate Charities 8-9 (Nov. 1, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (describing the varying approaches state law uses to require
corporate charities to adhere to restrictions placed on restricted gifts).
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course, the persistent and perplexing problem of distinguishing
legitimate mission evolution from illegitimate failures in mission
accountability.5 Takeover activity may represent constructive
evolution. If takeovers simply shift nonprofits' activities and policies
in order to allow them to grow with the times and face novel
problems in society, then takeovers support one of the important
policy rationales for having (and privileging) a nonprofit sector. Part
of the nonprofit sector's value, after all, lies in its ability to adapt to
meet new challenges as our nation and our world changes. 6
Alternatively, though, takeover activity might be destructive. It
might reroute the organization's financial and ideological resources
to goals and actions contrary to those of its major stakeholders; or it
might destroy or waste away those resources. The nonprofit sector is
also respected and supported for its strength in preserving the values
of founders7 and the intent of donors,' serving the needs of its
5. See Evelyn Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, in THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA 471, 476 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (noting the importance of

faithfulness to mission as an aspect of nonprofit accountability as well as the difficulty of its
application); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure
Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 205, 213 (2004) (describing
the potential failure in accountability represented by illegitimate shifts in nonprofit mission).
Compare MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 439-40
(2004) (arguing for a liberal application of cy pres and deviation doctrine to govern the
amendment of nonprofit corporate purposes), with Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M.
Boozang, Mission, Margin and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 80-85 (2005) (putting forward a "mission primacy" approach
to the mission accountability question under which directors of corporate nonprofits would be
bound by law to follow the articulated mission of their organizations but would be given
deference in their selection of means by which to do so), and Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable
Directors Direct, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 695-98, 715-16 (2005) (asserting that
nonprofit corporate directors should be given extensive powers to evolve their organizations'
missions over time, while this authority should be restricted for trustees of charitable trusts).
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL O'NEILL, NONPROFIT NATION 47 (2002) (noting the argument
from political science theory that the nonprofit sector exists, in part, as a fount for social
experimentation and development); James Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit
Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 43, 48-49 (Walter W.

Powell ed., 1987) (noting that one rationale put forward for the existence and benefits of the
nonprofit sector is its ability to experiment and innovate in ways the government and the
market cannot or will not).
7. See, e.g., David Horton Smith, The Impact of the Voluntary Sector on Society, in THE
NATURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 79, 82 (J. Steven Ott ed., 2001) (describing nonprofits'
important role in value preservation).
8. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialismand Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 1034-35 (2004) (noting and questioning the talismanic
power of the concept of donor intent in charity law); Brody, supra note 4, at 1-2 (noting
donor intent as "enshrined in the law as a lodestar").
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beneficiaries and the public,9 and inculcating participants with the
capacity and skills to function in civil society.' If takeovers are used
to undermine or dissipate these nonprofit contributions to society,
they threaten the sector's ability to play these important roles. They
also imperil the trust and respect the public has for nonprofits. If and
when nonprofit takeovers do function destructively, their dangers do
not remain confined to the organizations affected by them. Rather,
they have the capacity to undercut the value of the nonprofit sector,
to the detriment of society in general.
With these serious potential risks clarified, it is now appropriate
to turn to an explanation of the means by which nonprofit takeovers
can occur. Again, the for-profit analogues are an instructive starting
point for this discussion.
B. Control Transactionsin the For-ProfitSector
A vigorous market for corporate control, including takeover
activity, has long been recognized as important to a well-functioning
for-profit sector." The product in this market is the ability to control

9. See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 10-16
(2d ed. 1999) (identifying public benefit as one of the defining characteristics of the nonprofit
sector and service provision as one of its four functions); Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories
of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra
note 6, at 27, 28-33 (offering economic rationales for the nonprofit sector, including
nonprofits' ability to provide public goods and goods subject to contract failure, which would
otherwise be sub-optimally produced).
10. See SALAMON, supra note 9, at 17 (describing the creation and sustenance of social
capital as one of the functions of the nonprofit sector); Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the
Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
555, 571-78 (1998) (exploring the nonprofit sector's contributions to civil society and
representative democracy); Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost
of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 865-86 (2003) (explaining the
ability of nonprofits to contribute to civil society, particularly through their impact on
members); THE NATURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 7, at 50-51 (describing the
contributions of nonprofits to civil society as "pathways to participation" and "manifestations
of community").
11. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1145, 1153 (1984) (noting the socially valuable function of the market for corporate control,
though criticizing claims about the magnitude of this value as "overstated"); Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1539,
1542-43 & nn.11-12, 1551 (1996).
The identification of the market for corporate control can be traced at least to the
seminal work of Henry G. Manne. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); see also William J. Carney, The Legacy of The Market
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the assets and policies of for-profit corporations.12 The individual or
group with control over the assets and policies of a for-profit
corporation can redeploy them to uses likely to result in higher
profits. 3 Demand for control in this market is driven by the fact that
any such successes will be enjoyed, in some significant part, by the
individuals who obtain control. These successes may take the form of
increased share price, greater compensation, or some combination of
the two, and may be accompanied by beneficial reputational effects.' 4
Investors in the market for corporate control can acquire control
of a corporation's business through a variety of transactions.' These
investors might be individuals acting alone or in a syndicate. More
realistically, however, they will be other for-profit corporations
seeking to improve their own financial outlooks by a program of
acquisition or consolidation.' 6 Although myriad transactional forms
for Corporate Control" and Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215,
225 (1999) (describing Manne's contribution as "creat[ing] the paradigm that has dominated
discourse about the firm and corporate law for the remainder of the century, and shows every
prospect of a long and vital life in the next"); Fred S. McChesney, Manne, Mergers, and the
Market for Corporate Control, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 245, 247-52 (1999) (describing
Manne's three contributions to corporate scholarship as identifying the reasons for corporate
mergers, perceiving mergers as shareholder protection devices, and linking share price with
managerial efficiency).
Of course, Manne's insight builds on Berle's and Means's identification of the
separation of ownership and control as the principal governance problem in the modem public
corporation. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 233 (1932).
12. See Manne, supra note 11, at 112; Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for
CorporateControl, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (1989).
13. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 11, at 1542; Manne, supra note 11, at 112-13.
14. See Manne, supra note 11, at 112-13.
15. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 7.2 (2000) (speculating that
"[p]erhaps few other corporate transactions provide the participants with such different
options to achieve the same basic result, and, accordingly, place such a premium upon form" as
acquisition transactions); David W. Leebron, Games CorporationsPlay: A Theory of Tender
Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 157 (1986) ("[T]he choice of [acquisition] procedure is
largely within the hands of the acquiring corporation.").
For a survey of various friendly and unfriendly techniques for structuring change of
control transactions, see MATTHEW BENDER & CO., 1-2 CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND
MERGERS ch. 2 § 2.02 (2006) [hereinafter CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS]
(explaining a range of negotiated acquisitions); id. ch. 2 § 2.03 (summarizing the legal issues
arising out of tender offers, the principal type of hostile acquisitions); ROBERT A. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW§§ 11.1-4, 13.1-.2 (1986).
16. See, eg., Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 37-41 (Del.
1994) (describing the terms and motivations behind a friendly transaction in control of
Paramount Communications, which was concluded between Paramount fiduciaries and
Viacom, and also describing the subsequent unfriendly and competing bid for control of
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may be used to accomplish a for-profit change in control, for present
purposes, the friendly and unfriendly archetypes should be separated
and discussed.
In a friendly transaction, the acquirer negotiates with the
management and/or board of directors of the corporation over
which it seeks to acquire control, who act as the primary suppliers of
control of the target corporation. 7 Control can be supplied through
a sale of the target corporation's assets to the acquirer, which the
acquirer can then redeploy as it prefers.' 8 Alternatively, the acquirer
can obtain control through a merger or consolidation of the target
corporation with a corporation that the acquirer already controls.'
Control of this survivor corporation will afford the acquirer its
desired control over the target's assets and policies. The management
of the target corporation may negotiate these transactions, but under
corporate law, the target's board of directors will have to approve the
deal in order for it to go forward.2" In addition, depending on the
structure of the transaction, the target's board may have to solicit
and obtain approval by the target's shareholders in order for the
transaction to proceed. 2'

Paramount mounted by QVC Network). Corporate acquirers, of course, are run by
individuals, and the actions of corporations in the market for corporate control are frequently
and often accurately seen as the actions of their powerful leaders. The actions of both Viacom
and QVC in the facts leading up to the Paramountcase, for example, are identified closely
with their leaders, Sumner Redstone and Barry Diller. Id.
17. See GEVURTZ, supra note 15, § 7.3 (explaining that in sales of assets and mergers,
"the board of directors plays a gatekeeping role, in that the board must approve the transaction
before the shareholders of the target can vote upon it").
18.

See JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 22.01 (1997) (describing the purchase

of all or substantially all ofa target's assets as "[t]he most basic form of acquisition").
19. See id. (identifying merger and statutory consolidation as alternatives to acquisition
through purchase of assets).
20. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101 (West 2000) (requiring the board of directors of
each party to a merger to approve the merger agreement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271
(2001) (requiring the board of directors of selling corporation to approve its sale of all or
substantially all assets); see also COX ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 22.05, 22.12 (describing state
statutory authorizations of sales of all or substantially all assets, mergers, and consolidations
requiring board approval).
21. In general, corporate statutes require shareholders of both the acquirer and target
corporations to approve merger transactions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 25 1(c); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 903 (McKinney 2005). However, in a control transaction accomplished
through purchase of all or substantially all of the target's assets by the acquirer, statutes
typically require only the target's shareholders to approve. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
271(a) (requiring only the board of directors of selling corporation to approve its sale of all or
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IJ unfriendly transactions, often called takeovers or hostile
takeovers,22 the shareholders of the target corporation-rather than
its management and board of directors-act as the suppliers of
control. The acquirer obtains control over the assets and policies of
the target corporation by obtaining a working majority of shares to
vote for its candidates for the board. This working majority may be
secured by persuading the target's existing shareholders to grant the
acquirer proxies to vote their shares in favor of the acquirer's slate of
directors in a proxy contest.2" Alternatively, the needed majority may
be obtained by the acquirer's purchase of shares from the target's
existing shareholders in a tender offer.24 These techniques of
persuasion and purchase also may be used together to amass the
necessary votes. However the new majority is composed, when it
votes to transfer control from incumbent directors to the acquirersupported candidates, these new directors can appoint new
management and set about plans to use their newfound control to
alter the corporation's policies or redeploy its assets as they see fit.2"
substantially all assets); see also COX ET AL., supra note 18, § 22.02 (noting this distinction in
governance process necessary to approve the varying types of friendly acquisition transactions).
Of course, in many cases, state corporate law will not be the only relevant authority.
Exchange listing standards requiring a shareholder vote to approve changes in control will
prompt publicly-traded for-profit corporations to obtain such approval regardless of state law
requirements.

See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,

LISTED COMPANY MANUAL

§

312.03(d) (2006) (requiring shareholder approval "prior to an issuance that will result in a
change of control of the issuer").
22. A hostile takeover is a "takeover that was not approved or recommended by the
management or directors of the target company." CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS,

supra note 15, at 1-app. 5E, Glossary of Takeover Terms.
23. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654-55 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(describing efforts by substantial shareholder to change control over the target corporation
through consent solicitation seeking shareholders' consent to a bylaw change, which would
increase the size of the target's board and facilitate election of a new majority of directors);
Carrie Kirby, PeopleSoft Board Targeted, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 27, 2004, at Bi (describing
Oracle's nomination of five candidates for the board of PeopleSoft to run against candidates
favored by incumbents because, if elected, these candidates could have changed PeopleSoft's
position on a proposed takeover by Oracle).
24. See GEVURTZ, supra note 15, §§ 7.2.3, 7.3 (explaining how a tender offer can be
used to acquire control of a target corporation "without approval from-and, indeed, over the
opposition of-the target's board of directors," and noting that a purchase of most or all of a
target's stock from its shareholders is "the vehicle of choice for a 'hostile take-over"').
25. Acquirers will engage in purchases of control when they believe the policies of a
target corporation can be revised or the use of its assets can be varied to achieve gains sufficient
to make the costs of the change of control transaction worth bearing. See CLARK, supra note
15, § 13.2.1 (surveying the various reasons why acquirers might engage in tender offer
acquisitions: gains from management, synergy, monopolization, managerial benefits, or looting
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C. Control Transactionsin the Nonprofit Sector
A robust market for control has not been recognized as
important, or even existent, in the nonprofit sector.2 6 But the ability
to control the assets and policies of nonprofit organizations is a
product for which there is some demand. 27 The structure of
nonprofit organizations and the legal restrictions on the use of their
assets for private benefit prevent personal profit from driving the
demand for control of nonprofits. The fundamental legal quality of
the nonprofit form, the "nondistributional constraint," prohibits the
gains); Leebron, supra note 15, at 160-62 (explaining the various types of self-interest that
acquirers pursue through their acquisition transactions). Which type of transaction acquirers
will choose depends on a variety of factors, including, importantly, the relative costs of friendly
and unfriendly alternatives.
26. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 457, 489 (1996)
("No market for corporate control exists in the nonprofit organization."); Greaney &
Boozang, supra note 5, at 2 (noting "charitable corporations' lack of shareholders and market
for corporate control"); Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations:Do
Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 807, 821 (1989) ("Moreover,
even in nonprofits with members there is no possibility of disciplining managers through a
market for corporate control, since unlike business corporations nonprofits have no
stockholders with a right to both net assets and control."); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs
and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 227, 227-28 ("[I]n the
nonprofit world, owners are not well-defined; their voting rights are questionable or nonexistent; charitable goals are ambiguous . . . . [T]here is no market for corporate
control .... ). I, too, have noted the absence of a precise nonprofit corollary to the for-profit
market for corporate control. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 10, at 850 n.86 ("However,
neither the efficient capital structure nor the efficient market for corporate control rationale
translates well to the nonprofit context.").
It is prudent at this point to note some of the limitations on this Article's scope.
First, although nonprofit organizations may be organized as unincorporated associations,
charitable trusts, or nonprofit corporations, MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES:
CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND ASSOCIATIONS § 1:03 (2000), the nonprofit takeover

phenomena explored herein occur only in nonprofits using the corporate form. Thus, future
references to nonprofits and nonprofit organizations denote this type of organization.
Furthermore, the subject of this Article is confined to takeover activity and responses to it in
public benefit nonprofit corporations-traditional charities organized to pursue some public,
or other- regarding, purpose-rather than nonprofit corporations organized primarily to pursue
the interests of their members or for religious purposes. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT
CORP. ACT § 17.07 (1987) (defining public benefit nonprofit corporation). Finally, although
all fifty states and the District of Columbia have their own nonprofit pronouncements and
precedents, the balance of this Article will advocate reforms to nonprofit law generically. This is
possible because, unless otherwise noted, the underlying law either has not yet been articulated
or is substantially similar across jurisdictions.
27. See Brody, supra note 26, at 466 ("Because no individual may claim a nonprofit's
surplus, nor can anyone sell interests in a nonprofit, control over nonprofit assets and
operations becomes the strongest rights that exist in such an organization.").
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use of a nonprofit organization's profits for the benefit of its
directors, officers, or members. 8 Rather, profits must be reinvested
in the organization itself and in production of its mission.2 9
However, control transactions do occur in the nonprofit sector,
although the motivation for them is different. Rather than
responding to a personal profit incentive, acquirers of a target
nonprofit seek control in order to impose their views of how best to
achieve the mission of the organization, which often will permit
them the practical ability to reconceptualize what that mission
should be.
Despite the unlikelihood of personal financial enrichment
through obtaining control of a nonprofit, various types of entities,
individuals, and groups stand to gain from securing the power to
direct or redirect a nonprofit's mission and assets. Those in control
of a potential acquirer may believe that annexing the assets of a
target nonprofit will improve the acquirer's efficiency, profitability,
or ability to serve its own mission. A potential individual acquirer
may believe, out of a sense of social entrepreneurship, that her vision
of how to set the policies or deploy the assets of a target nonprofit
will best achieve the charitable purposes the target pursues. A
potential acquirer group may feel that the mission of a target
nonprofit has strayed from its appropriate precincts, or the group
may feel that the target's mission and programs for pursuing it have
become stale and need to evolve in order to address contemporary
needs. In any of these situations, control over the target nonprofit
will be a prize demanded on its own, without the need for personal
profit to motivate potential acquirers.
As in the for-profit context, potential nonprofit acquirers can use
a range of transactions to attain control of their targets. In fact, the
range of options for nonprofit control transactions is slightly wider
than that in the for-profit context. Still, a continuum of friendly to
unfriendly types of transactions can be observed.

28. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980) (coining the term "nondistributional constraint" to describe this prohibition and
identifying its role in an economic rationale for the nonprofit sector); see also, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE % 5410, 5049 (West 2005) (prohibiting such distributions to members); REVISED
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.40, 13.01 (prohibiting payments from nonprofit
corporations to their "members, directors, or officers").
29. See Hansmann, supra note 28, at 838.
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Friendly control transactions occur in nonprofits in much the
same way that they do in for-profits. The target nonprofit's board of
directors and management act as the supplier of control. A potential
acquirer must negotiate with the target's board and management to
reach acceptable terms for a purchase and sale of assets, merger, or
consolidation, and the directors ultimately must approve any such
transaction. 30 In nonprofits that opt for a governance structure with
member-elected fiduciaries, these members will generally also be
required to approve friendly transactions in control.3" When a
nonprofit has selected a self-perpetuating board as its governance
structure, however, the board will be the only internal body required
to approve friendly changes in control.32 Moreover, even when
external parties must approve a friendly transaction in control, the
board alone can initiate consideration of any such deal.33
30. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 11.03, 12.02 (requiring board
approval of a nonprofit corporation's plan of merger and sale of assets other than in the regular
course of business); see, eg., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-6a-1101 to -1202 (2000).
31.

See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 11.03, 12.02 (requiring, when a

nonprofit corporation has members, that its members approve a merger or sale of assets by the
lesser of two-thirds of the votes cast or a majority of the voting power); see, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 180, §§ 8A, 10 (West 2005) (requiring that two-thirds of a nonprofit's
members approve any sale, lease or exchange of substantially all of its assets, merger, or
consolidation of those nonprofits with members).
32. Sometimes governmental authorities must be notified of or approve friendly control
transactions, but governmental involvement will depend on the jurisdiction and form of the
transaction. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 11.02(b), 12.02(g) (requiring
attorney general to be given notice of proposed nonprofit mergers and sales of assets outside
the regular course of business); see, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 510, 511, 907
(McKinney 2005) (requiring court approval for sale of all assets and mergers by nonprofit
corporations).
33. Friendly nonprofit acquisitions have been the subject of some academic discussion.
See, e.g., Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilitiesof Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting Strategic
Consolidation Through Law and Public Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1089, 1113 (2001) (arguing
for the removal of obstacles to such transactions as a way to encourage "[s]trategic, mission
based restructuring"); Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the
Duties of Parent Corporations Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health Care
Systems, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 979, 988-89 (2001) (reviewing the effects of various types of
friendly nonprofit affiliations and acquisitions). Reports of particular nonprofit mergers also
sometimes analyze the potential benefits of nonprofit merger activity. See, e.g., Donald Haider,
Common Bonds, 2004 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 68, 69 (providing a case study of a
merger between two job training organizations); Donald H. J. Hermann, Religious Identity
and the Health Care Market: Mergers and Acquisitions Involving Religiously Affiliated
Providers, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 927, 937-45 (2001) (surveying the effects of mergers of
religiously affiliated nonprofit hospitals); Edward F. McArdle, Health Law, 53 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 629, 666-68 (2003) (critiquing a determination that the proposed merger of two
nonprofit hospitals did not require court approval or notice to the attorney general, despite
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In unfriendly or hostile nonprofit control transactions, a
potential acquirer looks to a group or entity other than current
fiduciaries to supply it with the control it desires. This dynamic can
occur only in those nonprofit corporations with member-elected
fiduciaries. As mentioned above, nonprofit corporations must choose
one of two systems for composing their boards of directors.3 4 They

possible reductions in health services in the facilities' service area); Nicole Wallace, Two
Animal-Protection Groups Plan to Merge in 2005, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 9, 2004, at
33 (describing merger plans of the Humane Society of the U.S. and the Fund for Animals).
Conversions-whereby a nonprofit is transformed into a for-profit entity-have
been addressed particularly often. There are numerous critics of conversions, many of whom
would deem them anything but "friendly," and who question when these transactions are
appropriate for nonprofit organizations and whether they can be accomplished without lapses
by their fiduciaries. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, A Proposalfor an Exit Tax on Nonprofit
Conversion Transactions,23 J. CORP. L. 779, 781 (1998) (proposing an "exit tax" on hospital
conversions in order to facilitate regulatory interest in such transactions, safeguard community
interests in charitable assets, and standardize governmental use of conversion proceeds); John
F. Coverdale, Preventing Insider Misappropriation of Not-for-Profit Health Care Provider
Assets: A Federal Tax Law Prescription,73 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1998) (surveying evidence
of insiders' private enrichment and misappropriation of charitable assets during the period of
unregulated nonprofit conversions); Phill Kline, Robert T. Stephan & Reid F. Holbrook,
Protecting Charitable Assets in Hospital Conversions: An Important Role for the Attorney
General, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 369 (2004) (raising the concern that in conversions
"the community served by the hospital system risks losing large sums of charitable healthcare
benefits, which have been entrusted to the community for its residents' access and use");
Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and FederalResponse to Hospitals'
Changes in Charitable Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 231-32 (1997) ("While never
explicitly stated as a motivation for sale or conversion, a review of recent sales and conversions
suggests that the pursuit of personal gain by executives and/or board members may influence
the desire to sell or convert a not-for-profit hospital."); id. at 248-50 (favoring enhanced
regulatory oversight of nonprofit conversions to counter the inherent conflict of interest that
directors face in studying and implementing such transactions). Yet, in structure, conversion
transactions are friendly; the board, generally alone, supplies control to the acquirer. See James
D. Standish, Hospital Conversion Revenue: A Critical Analysis of Present Law and Future
Proposals To Reform the Manner in Which Revenue Generated from Hospital Conversions is
Employed, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 131, 132-33 (1998) (describing five variants
of conversion transaction, all of which require board assent: asset purchase and sale, merger,
joint venture, lease, and restructuring); James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion
Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organizationsto ForProfit Status, 23 J. CORP. L. 701, 714-15 (1998) (laying out similar categories of conversion
transactions); Kevin F. Donohue, Crossroadsin Hospital Conversions-A Survey of Nonprofit
HospitalConversion Legislation, 8 ANNALs HEALTH L. 39, 41 (1999) (similar).
In contrast to the array of scholarship available on friendly nonprofit control
transactions, commentators have yet to recognize and analyze the other, less friendly,
transactions by which control of a nonprofit organization may be obtained. The balance of this
Article will concentrate on this category of transactions and the implications of reactions to
them by nonprofit fiduciaries and the courts.
34. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 10, at 829-30, 843-844.
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can opt to empower directors themselves to appoint their successors,
creating a self-perpetuating board,3 5 or they can choose to define a
group of members who will elect the board. 6 In nonprofits that
choose a member-elected board, the members can supply control to
a potential acquirer without the participation and acceptance of
directors or management simply by voting for an acquirer's proposed
directors in a contested election.
The nondistributional constraint might be expected to frustrate
hostile takeovers of nonprofits, as it mandates the absence of saleable
equity shares in a nonprofit corporation.3 7 Presumably, the direct sale
of membership voting rights, like that of shareholder voting rights, is
also restricted. 8 Thus, a potential acquirer of control of a nonprofit
corporation cannot secure a majority simply by purchasing the votes
of existing members as it would purchase the shares (and thus the
votes) of shareholders in a for-profit tender offer. However,
techniques of both persuasion and purchase remain available to those
seeking to obtain control of nonprofit corporations with memberelected boards.
A potential acquirer of control over a nonprofit corporation with
a member-elected board can utilize persuasion by engaging in a
35. See id. at 829-30.
36. See id. at 829.
37. See Hansmann, supra note 28, at 838 ("[A] nonprofit corporation is distinguished
from a for-profit (or 'business') corporation primarily by the absence of stock or other indicia
of ownership that give their owners a simultaneous share in both profits and control.").
38. Although nonprofit corporate statutes do not expressly state a prohibition on the
sale of members' voting rights, such a prohibition may be inferred from a variety of sources. See
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 7.27(c) (1987) (authorizing a nonprofit
corporation "to reject a vote, consent, waiver, or proxy appointment" if the corporation,
"acting in good faith, has reasonable basis for doubt about the validity of the signature on it or
about the signatory's authority to sign for the member"); id. § 7.30 (limiting the enforceability
of voting agreements for public benefit corporations to cases where such agreements have "a
reasonable purpose not inconsistent with the corporation's public or charitable purposes").
In the shareholder voting context, courts' attitudes toward vote-buying have
softened slightly over time. Compare Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 194 A. 19,
22 (Del. Ch. 1937) (rejecting shareholder proxies that had been purchased with cash because
such purchase suggested fraud and was contrary to public policy), and Douglas R. Cole, Eproxiesfor Sale? Corporate Vote-Buying in the Internet Age, 76 WASH. L. REV. 793, 819 (2001)
("[T]he common law approach to vote-buying was a regime of per se illegality."), with
Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22-26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (refusing to apply a bright-line rule
to invalidate shareholder proxies purchased for cash where such purchase had been disclosed
and the challenged transaction had passed with a substantial majority), and Cole, supra at
824-31 (identifying Schreiber as a seminal case and noting that recent Delaware cases have
loosened the historic prohibition on shareholder vote-buying).
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reasonable facsimile of a for-profit proxy contest. The potential
acquirer would propose a slate of board candidates to the member
electorate along with a pitch to persuade voting members to support
such candidates and their platform.3 9 This persuasive endeavor might
take various forms. A potential acquirer might argue that its
candidates would run the organization more efficiently, thus
maximizing its ability to achieve its mission. It might suggest that
the current board has veered from the appropriate mission of the
organization and that the insurgent slate would preserve the mission
that the donors and members intended. It might even argue that the
mission of the organization has been too narrowly pursued, and that
the new candidates would assist the nonprofit in evolving to meet
current challenges. Whatever the tack, if the acquirer can persuade a
majority of the members voting to believe that the challengers will
pursue the members' preferences to a greater degree than will the
incumbents and to vote accordingly, the acquirers' candidates will
obtain a majority of directors' seats." Thus, the acquirer can secure
its desired control without participation by the board of directors or
current management.
Perhaps surprisingly, even without saleable equity shares, a route
to purchase control of a nonprofit with a member-elected board also
will often be available to potential acquirers. It depends on the
individual nonprofit's definition of membership. In a nonprofit with
voting members, the articles of incorporation or bylaws define the
class of voting members.4 The authority of organizations to define
their own membership criteria confers considerable autonomy on
individual nonprofits to demarcate the class of persons sufficiently
39. Nonprofit corporate statutes provide for member election of directors when
members exist. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.04.
40. In a nonprofit corporation with a member-elected board, a majority or even
plurality vote of the members will suffice to elect a slate of directors. See id. (providing for
election of all directors at annual meetings by vote of the members); id. § 7.23 ("[T]he
affirmative vote of the votes represented and voting (which affirmative votes also constitute a
majority of the required quorum) is the act of the members"). It is worthy of note, however,
that nonprofits may choose to use staggered board structures. See id. § 8.06 (permitting
nonprofits to stagger directors' board terms); see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 504.806 (Supp. 2006)
(similar). In nonprofits that take this route, would-be acquirers will require greater time and
patience for a takeover through contested director elections to succeed.
41. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.01 ("The articles or bylaws may
establish criteria or procedures for admission of members."); see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 504.601
(Supp. 2006) (permitting nonprofit corporations to define the class of their voting members in
either their articles of incorporation or bylaws).
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involved with the organization to be assigned a role in its
governance. Despite this wide potential scope to set out qualities or
positions that entitle individuals to member status, many nonprofits
opt for clarity and ease of administration and simply bestow
membership on those who make a certain monetary contribution to
the organization-and not necessarily a substantial one.42 When this
is the case, a potential acquirer can purchase, or arrange to have its
supporters purchase, a sufficient number of memberships to
overpower any prior member opposition to its proposed slate of
directors, and thereby vote in a new leadership.
This purchase route would appear subject only to the limitation
of the acquirer's ability to recruit participants in the takeover and to
fund them. In a nonprofit with a member-elected board and
membership determined solely by monetary contribution, an
acquirer could finance the purchase of a limitless number of
memberships in order to achieve a majority vote and thereby secure
control. In contrast, in the for-profit context, the pool of authorized
and outstanding shares is limited, and additions to it are determined
solely by the directors.4 3 A potential acquirer seeking to purchase
shares sufficient to obtain control must bargain with existing
shareholders or, perhaps, negotiate with the board to obtain and

42. See, e.g., Bylaws of Lions Blind & Charity Fund, Inc. art. I, § 2,
http://bcfundinc.org/bylaws.pdf (requiring General Members, who participate in the
director selection process, to make a capital contribution of at least $200 each for this
privilege);
Constitution
and
Bylaws
of Hands
Four
Dancers
of Ithaca,
wwvw.hands4dancers.org/Constitution-an.ylaws-rev.l.doc
(last visited Nov. 8, 2006)
(entitling "[a]ll persons interested in dance and music ... to become members of HFDI upon
payment of dues," currently set at $10, and thereby granting rights to vote for directors and
officers);
Seattle
Community
Network
Association
Membership
Levels,
http://www.scn.org/scna/membership.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (listing donation
levels required to become a voting member starting at $25 per year); see also Peter Panepento,
Behind the Numbers, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 4, 2005, at 33 (describing the use of feebased membership criteria at various nonprofit organizations, though not specifying whether
memberships referenced were mere labels or conferred governance powers).
43. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2005) ("Every corporation may issue 1
or more classes of stock . . . and such designations . . . shall be stated and expressed in the
certificate of incorporation or of any amendment thereto, or in the resolution or resolutions
providing for the issue of such stock adopted by the board of directors pursuant to authority
expressly vested in it by the provisions of its certificate of incorporation."); see also GEVURTZ,
supra note 15, § 1.4.1(4) (explaining that the articles of incorporation must specify "the total
number of shares of stock a corporation may issue").
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purchase a new issue of shares." In this sense, potential acquirers of
control of nonprofits have a wider range of options than those
seeking control over for-profit entities.

In sum, as in the for-profit context, various mechanisms exist for
transferring control of nonprofit organizations, and not all of these
transactions are friendly. Often, the entities, individuals, and groups
that desire control over the assets and policies of a target nonprofit
will negotiate with the target's fiduciaries to supply it. If incumbent
fiduciaries do not welcome such changes, however, other
constituencies of target nonprofits sometimes will offer would-be
acquirers an alternative source of control. In nonprofit corporations
with member-elected fiduciaries, those who seek to seize control can
achieve their goals through members, using techniques of persuasion
and purchase.
Importantly, however, nonprofit takeover activity is not merely
another transactional form needing academic description. It also can
have serious normative implications for individual organizations, the
nonprofit sector, and society at large. The next Part offers some realworld examples of when, where, and how unfriendly nonprofit
control transactions have been attempted and fiduciaries' and courts'
responses to them. The facts of these scenarios and the strongly held
ideals of those on either side of them illuminate the issues raised by
nonprofit takeovers in ways even an elegant theory of their possibility
cannot communicate.
III. NONPROFIT TAKEOVER ACTIVITY IN ACTION

This Part relates the stories of takeover attempts and preparations
recently experienced by two major nonprofit organizations: the
Sierra Club and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals. After introducing the organizations and their relevant
histories and governance structures, it describes the techniques
employed by those who sought to wrest control from incumbent
leaders-each of which primarily exemplifies one variant of the
44. While conceptually possible, this scenario seems far-fetched since the very directors
who the acquirer seeks to go around using a hostile transaction would have to be convinced to
issue the new shares.
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hostile takeover strategies explained above. These techniques
inspired significant defensive actions by the incumbent leaders in
both organizations. The gravity with which these defenses were
undertaken, as well as their magnitude, illustrates the incumbents'
genuine angst over the impact a successful takeover would have on
the missions of their organizations. Similarly, the quite hostile
judicial reactions to these nonprofit takeover efforts, especially the
deferential standard employed to review the defensive measures
utilized by incumbents, suggest that the potentially dangerous
impact of these transactions is not lost on reviewing courts.
A. Showdown at the Sierra Club
The Sierra Club was incorporated in California in 1892 by John
Muir, a Scottish-American conservationist, and nearly 200 charter
members.4 5 Early on, the Club devoted itself to protecting and
expanding the parks and forests of the nascent national park system,
especially those in California and the far West.46 It also began
traditions of planning and operating nature outings and of
publishing books and periodicals addressing nature and
conservation.4 7 Over time, the Club also became involved with
environmental activism, supporting local and national policies in line
with its agenda.
The Club currently is incorporated as a nonprofit public benefit
corporation under California law,48 with a member-elected board of
fifteen directors serving staggered three-year terms.4 9 Voting
membership is open to anyone who files an application, pays annual
dues, and is interested in advancing the Club's purposes.5 " These
purposes, as stated in its bylaws, are

45. See Highlights of the Sierra Club's History, http://wxvxv.sierraclub.org/
history/timeline.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Sierra Club History]; Sierra Club,
Sierra
Club
Articles
of
Incorporation:
Original
Version
(1892),
http://
www.sierraclub.org/policy/artices.asp [hereinafter Sierra Club Articles of Incorporation].
46. See Sierra Club History, supra note 45.
47. See id.
48. See Sierra Club Articles of Incorporation art. 2 (1981), http://www.sierraclub.org/
policy/articles current.asp.
49. See Bylaws and Standing Rules of the Sierra Club, bylaws 4.8, 5.1, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8
(2006), http://xvw.sierraclub.org/policy/bylaws.pdf [hereinafter Sierra Club Bylaws].
50. See id. bylaw 4, § 1.
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to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to
practice and promote the responsible use of the earth's ecosystems
and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and
restore the quality of the natural and human environment;
and to
51
use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.

In addition to these stated purposes, the Club has declared itself to
have a public policy mission and has committed all levels 5 of its
programs to influencing public, private, and corporate policies. 1
As the Club's purposes and mission statement are broadly drawn,
it should come as no surprise that disputes have arisen regarding
appropriate policy objectives and priorities. The Club prides itself on
embracing a "democratic" model for sorting through these
predictable conflicts.5 3 Ballot questions raising issues of importance
may be posed to the membership by the board of directors, the
president, or upon member petition. 4 In addition, conflicts over
Club policy may be resolved through board elections. The structure
and bylaws of the Club permit board candidates to be nominated by
petition or by a board-appointed Nominating Committee.5 ' Any
attempt to take over the Club must be waged over time because the
board utilizes staggered terms; 6 however, a sustained program of
supporting candidates can shift the control dynamic of the
organization.
Over the past decade, the Sierra Club has experienced a series of
attempts to obtain control over its policies through ballot questions
51. Id. bylaw 2.2.
52. See Sierra Club Purposes and Goals, http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/goals.asp
(last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
53. See Sierra Club Bylaws, supra note 49, bylaws 4, 5, 11 (dealing with membership,
board of directors, and ballots of the club, respectively); see also Stephen G. Greene, Hostile
Takeover or Rescue? Sierra Club's Board CandidatesFight to Shape the Group's Future, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 15, 2004, at 24.
54. See Sierra Club Bylaws, supra note 49, bylaws 11.1-11.2. To obtain a vote on a
ballot question by petition, the request for the vote must be supported by the number of
members in good standing equaling at least two percent of the number of members who cast
ballots in the last election. See id. bylaw 11.2; see also id. bylaw 11.4 (stating that ballot
questions are decided by a majority of the ballots cast so long as this number equals or exceeds
a majority of votes required for a quorum); id. SR. 11.2.1(f) (requiring a signer to be "a
member of the Club in good standing for at least sixty days" and to "have signed within six
months of the date of submission of the signed petition" for a ballot question).
55. See id. bylaws 5.2-5.3. Petition candidates may reach the ballot by obtaining
signatures from one-twentieth of one percent of the membership, but not less than one
hundred nor more than five hundred members. See id. bylaw 5.2.
56. See id. bylaws 5.1, 5.7.
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and contests for the board of directors.57 The most volatile of these
began following a 1996 board resolution that adopted a neutral
stance on U.S. immigration policy. In response, members of the
Club formed Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization (SUSPS) to
"advocate a return to traditional (1970-1996) Sierra Club
population policy," 8 which supported the stabilization of the U.S.
population through various mechanisms, including the reduction of
immigration levels, in order to improve the country's environmental
status.5 9 In 1998, SUSPS introduced its first ballot question,
advocating that the Club return to a stance supporting immigration
limits on environmental grounds.6" After the question was defeated
by the Club membership, 6 the Club board again resolved to remain
neutral on the immigration question." SUSPS then changed its
57. Early efforts included a few successful director nominations by the John Muir
Sierrans ("JMS"), a group of former Club leaders, and other members who believe the Club
has become too weak in its support of conservationist causes and who advocate a return to
grassroots organizing, nominated five petition candidates. See Leora Broydo, Mutiny at the
Sierra Club, MOTHER JONES,
Nov.
3,
1998,
available at http://www.
motherjones.com/news/feature/1998/11/sierra.html ("The renegades call themselves the
John Muir Sierrans. They say they are a 'grassroots network of Sierra Club leaders who
advocate stronger stances on conservation issues,' and they say the club is investing too much
in inside-the-beltway tactics while starving environmental campaigns that members are keen on
supporting."); Eric Brazil, Sierra Club Legend Tries to Regain Control; Ev-Leader Brower Runs
for President, S.F. EXAMINER, May 21, 1999, at Al ("[Brower] sounds his recurring theme:
,no more club cop-outs ....
Anyone who knows [Sierra Club history] knows the same and
unnecessary destruction wrought by compromise.'"); see also Michael Dorsey et al., Letter to
the Editor, MOTHER JONES, Jan. 5, 1999 (disputing Broydo's characterization of the conflict
at Sierra Club and asserting that the JMS faction within the Club was a valuable part of its
diversity). When the JMS candidate for Club President lost in 1999, however, the group's
activity slowed. See Nation and World News: San Francisco; Environmentalist Quits Sierra
Club's Board, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, May 20, 2000, at 20.
58. About SUSPS, http://www.susps.org/info/about.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006);
see also History of SUSPS, http://www.susps.org/history/history.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2006) [hereinafter SUSPS History] (detailing SUSPS's history and activities).
59. See Sierra Club
Population
Policies, http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/
conservation/population.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Sierra Club Population
Policies] (noting that in 1978, the Sierra Club board adopted a policy that urged Congress to
review U.S. immigration policies and practices, but with a view that international migration
was only a small part of the world population problem).
60. See SUSPS History, supra note 58.
61. See id.; see also CENTER FOR NEW COMMUNITY, HOSTILE TAKEOVER: RACE,
IMMIGRATION AND THE SIERRA CLUB 6 (2004), http://www.buildingdemocracy.org/
reports/hostiletakeover.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (reporting that sixty percent of the
Sierra Club's membership voted against the proposal).
62. See Sierra Club Population Policies, supra note 59. The Club board also put forward
a ballot question in the next election seeking to increase the number of signatures necessary to
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tactics and began endorsing petition candidates in Club board
elections.6 3 The new course slowly began to show success; SUSPSendorsed candidates had won three board seats by 2 0 0 3 .
SUSPS was poised to make its boldest gains yet in the 2004
election. If three additional candidates backed by SUSPS were
elected, they and other reform-minded directors would have
sufficient board seats to press the immigration question.6" The three
SUSPS-backed candidates boasted impressive professional and

obtain a ballot question by petition. See SUSPS History, supra note 58. However, the Club
membership voted this measure down. See id.
63. See Miguel Bustillo & Kenneth R. Weiss, The Nation; Election Becomes a Fight over
Sierra Club's Future;Animal-Rights Activists and Anti-immigrationAdvocates Are Teaming in
a Bid To Control the Board, to the Dismay of Traditionalists,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at Al;
Michelle Nijhuis, Que Sierra, Sierra; Immigration Controversy Engulfs Sierra Club Board
Election, GRIST, Mar. 1, 2004, available at http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2004/
03/01/nijhuis-sierra/.
64. See Sierra
Club Yearly Election Results,
http://www.susps.org/info/
election results.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (noting a win by SUSPS-endorsed candidate
Ben Zuckerman in 2002 and a double victory for Doug LaFollette and Paul Watson in 2003);
see also Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief Under Corporations Code
Section 5617; Declaratory Relief; Breach of Fiduciary Duty; and Unfair Business Practices
Under B&P Section 17200 at 4, Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, No.
429277 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint]
("By 2003 JMS and SUSPS had been successful in gaining a voice on the board. Six of the
fifteen, or 40%, of the sitting directors at the end of 2003 (Ed Dobson, Force, Hanscom,
LaFolette, Watson, Zuckerman) were endorsed by either JMS or SUSPS."); Nijhuis, supra
note 63.
65. See Ben Adler, Sierra Club Votes for Its Future, NATION, Apr. 13, 2004, availableat
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040426/adler
(describing
the
SUSPS website's
encouragement of supporters to "vote for its slate in the election"); Bill Berkowitz, Sierra Club
Shenanigans, DISSIDENT VOICE, Feb. 19, 2004, http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Feb04/
Berkowitz0219.htm ("Three of the candidates are being supported by a group called
SUSPS ....
[A]II of whom have had little to do with the Sierra Club in the past."); Adam
Werbach, Anti-Immigration Coalition Seeks Control of Sierra Club, IN THESE TIMES, Mar. 9,
2004, available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/402/ ("If the three
candidates backed by Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization are elected this year, the
immigration-control faction will have enough votes on the 15-member board to move the
issue.").
Reports on the support provided to the candidates by SUSPS varied. See Terence
Chea, Immigration Debate Divides Sierra Club as Factions Vie for Control, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, Feb. 29, 2004, at 24 ("Past and present Sierra Club leaders say the anti-immigrant
faction has teamed up with animal rights activists in an attempt to hijack the 112-year-old
organization and its $100 million annual budget."); Nijhuis, supra note 63 ("SUSPS helped all
three candidates gather signatures ....
However, the candidates have repeatedly stated that
they are running independently of one another.").
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environmental credentials.66 Two of the candidates, Richard Lamm
and Frank Morris, specifically espoused the SUSPS position that the
Club should adopt (or re-adopt) a policy in support of population
control, including limits on immigration. 67 The third candidate,
David Pimentel, mentioned his great concern with the
environmental impact of the rising U.S. population in his candidate
ballot statement. 6' His only specific statement on the Club's
immigration policy, however, evinced agreement with its neutral
stance. 69
The actions of SUSPS fit neatly into the model of an unfriendly
bid for control of a nonprofit corporation with a member-elected
board. SUSPS, as insurgents, sought to obtain control of the Club in
order to change its policies on immigration. The SUSPS actions were
hostile and can be viewed as a takeover attempt because the
insurgents looked to the Club's members to supply them with the
desired control rather than negotiating with current fiduciaries. In
particular, the strategy of supporting candidates to oppose
incumbent directors in the Club's annual election exemplifies the
66. See First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief; Declaratory Relief; Unfair
Business Practices Under B & P Sections 17200; Violations of Corporations Code Sections
5520, 5523, 5615; Bylaw 5.4; Standing Rules 5-2-6(2), 5-2-6(3), and 5-2-9 at exhibit B,
Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, No. 429277 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 15,
2004) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint] (reproducing the candidate ballot statements of
Richard Lamm, Frank Morris, and David Pimentel for the 2004 Club board election, which
include information on their credentials). Richard Lamm was a former governor of Colorado, a
public policy professor at the University of Denver, and a member of the Conservation
Foundation's board of directors. See id. Frank Morris was a retired professor and former
executive director of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation. See id. David Pimentel, a
tenured Professor of Ecology at Cornell University who had written scores of articles on
agriculture and pest control also had served on the board of the National Audubon Society. See
id.
67. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at exhibit B (reproducing Lamm's and
Morris's candidate ballot statements for the 2004 Club board election, which include
information on their positions in support of population control); Sierra Club, Board of
Directors Candidate Forum: All Candidates and their Responses (on file with author)
[hereinafter Board of Directors Candidate Forum] (expressing candidates Richard Lamm's and
Frank Morris's positions that the Club should not remain neutral on immigration issues).
68. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at exhibit B (noting in Pimentel's
candidate ballot statement that since the election of President Carter, in his opinion the last
"really good environmental President ... the USA has grown by 80 million persons and this
growth is accelerating rather than diminishing.").
69. See Board of Directors Candidate Forum, supra note 67, at 9 (answering a question
on whether the Club's neutral position on immigration should be changed by stating,
"Currently, I hold a neutral position on immigration. I feel that there are far more important
environmental problems than immigration ....
).
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persuasive variant of nonprofit takeover tactics. SUSPS insurgents
appealed to existing members for their votes, hoping that they could
persuade sufficient members to support insurgent candidates.7" The
insurgents would achieve the change in control they desired if the
voting results delivered a board majority willing to revisit the Club's
immigration policy.
The response by the Sierra Club's incumbent leadership to the
SUSPS actions likewise demonstrates the concerns that nonprofit
takeover activity can raise within a targeted organization. Despite
their environmental and political qualifications, the Club's leadership
feared that the SUSPS-backed candidates had ties to extreme antiimmigration groups with nativist and racist tendencies.7 1 If elected,
they feared these candidates and the new majority they would join
would seriously damage the Club and its reputation through their
pursuit of restrictions on U.S. immigration. Thus, the incumbents
moved quickly to take defensive action.
During a January 30, 2004 telephonic meeting, the board
approved two motions intended to combat the threat posed by
SUSPS candidates.7 2 The first authorized and instructed the Club's
staff to (1) add an "urgent election notice" to the ballot materials to
70. Although the main SUSPS tactic was an attempt to persuade existing Sierra Club
members, SUSPS also appears to employ some purchase tactics. In addition to "encourag[ing]
Sierra Club members to sign up with SUSPS in order to support [their] efforts," SUSPS asks
those who are not currently Club members to "sign up with SUSPS and also join the Sierra
Club to support our efforts in the annual Spring election." SUSPS Homepage,
http://wwv.susps.org (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
71. See Adler, supra note 65; Felicity Barringer, Bitter Division for Sierra Club on
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at Al; Glen Martin, Sierra Club Vote Backs Status
Quo; Sound Defeat for Dissident Slate Seeking Strict Immigration Control, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
22, 2004, at Al. For an exhaustive review of the candidates' alleged links with extreme antiimmigration groups, see CENTER FOR NEW COMMUNITY, supra note 61. For a refutation of
them, see Sierra Democracy Homepage, http://wwv.sierrademocracy.org (last visited Nov. 8,
2006), especially its links on Internal Power Struggle and FAQ.
72. See Sierra Club, Briefs of Action of a Meeting of the Board of Directors 2-3 (Jan.
30, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Briefs of Action of a Meeting of the Board of
Directors] (transcript of telephonic meeting). Prior to consideration of these motions, the
board considered endorsing a slate of candidates or signaling support for Committeenominated candidates only. See id. at 1-2. Ultimately, it passed only a motion stating the
board's position that information describing the Nominating Committee's selection criteria,
provided to Club members in their ballots, was sufficient to apprise members of the
qualifications of Committee nominees. See id. An alternative motion proposed by Director
LaFollette failed. See id. It would have reaffirmed the impropriety of Club expenditures in
support or in opposition to individual candidates and struck an introductory statement from
the ballot, as appearing to favor Committee candidates. See id. at 1.
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be sent to Club members, (2) request that individual chapter and
group newsletters print the notice, and (3) send emails to members
following up on the notice and encouraging them to vote in the
election.7 3 The urgent election notice stated:
This year there is an unprecedented level of outside involvement
and attention to the Club's Board of Director's election. Outside,
non-environmental organizations have endorsed candidates in the
Club's Board elections. Several outside organizations have
endorsed Club Board candidates and are urging their supporters to
join the Club as a means to influence club policy in line with their
non-environmental agendas.
Those outside groups that may be attempting to intervene in
the Club's Board of Director's elections include:
Center for American Unity - VirginiaDare/Vdare.com collective
that includes "white nationalist writers." [sic]
Coloradans for American Immigration Reform
Federation for American Immigration Reform
Fur Commission USA
Limitstogrowth.com
HempflagUSA.org - promotes marijuana legalization
National Alliance - "ideology from a white racial perspective"
National Immigration Alert (NumbersUSA)
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
Project USA
Social Contract Press
Southern Poverty Law Center

73.
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White Politics Inc./Overthrow.com
The Sierra Club has become an even more influential and
effective voice in American Society over the last decade. Now it
appears that non-environmental groups are trying to take advantage
of the Club's open and democratic nature to influence the
composition of our Board of Directors and our policies.
Faced with this threat, the Board of Directors urges every
member of the Club [to] act to ensure that the Sierra Club remains
faithful to its environmental mission and principles. Please cast your
vote in this year's election as a means of demonstrating to outside
groups that they cannot influence our organization. Vote for
candidates whose positions reflect your values and vision for the
future of the Sierra Club. Vote for candidates whose experience
matches what you believe the Club needs. Vote for candidates
endorsed by Club leaders who you trust....

Democracy really does work-but only if we all vote. Help
maintain the Sierra Club's tradition as America's preeminent

democratic and grass roots advocate for the environment.7 4
The board's other motion approved a recent action taken by the
Club's Inspectors of Election, which had permitted an article by
Drusha Mayhue to be printed in some Club chapters' newsletters. 75
The article was critical of two SUSPS-supported, then-current
directors, as well as SUSPS-backed petition candidates in the
upcoming election, and described their efforts as a threat to the Club
and its mission.76
The dire warnings authorized by the board illustrate the
incumbents' fears that the insurgents' "non-environmental"
objectives would displace or damage the Club's mission. Distributing
such a notice in addition to the election materials, and providing
multiple routes for doing so, was itself an extreme unprecedented
step. Further, the language of the notice speaks in imposing terms,
citing the "threat" posed by outsiders attempting to "influence" the
organization and disrupt its commitment to "its environmental
mission and principles." 77 Likewise, the Mayhue article spoke
Id. at 2-3.
75. See id. at 3.
74.

76.
77.

See First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at exhibit D.
See Briefs of Action of a Meeting of the Board of Directors, supra note 72, at 3.
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pointedly of the insurgents' intent to "hijack" the agenda and assets
of the Club in order to pursue "narrow, personal, one-issue agendas"
that "widely differ[] from the Club's historic conservation
mission."7 8 After launching their attacks on the motives of insurgent
candidates, the notice and article reminded members of their own
ability to defeat the takeover threat using the votes guaranteed to
them by the Club's democratic governance structure.7 9
A number of Club members concerned with the SUSPS efforts
viewed the board's actions as insufficient to safeguard the mission of
the Club. Some formed groups like "Groundswell Sierra" to resist
the SUSPS-supporred candidates.8" In addition, three Club members
entered the board race as petition candidates"i but declared in their
ballot statements that they did not, in fact, seek election to the Club
board.82 Later called the "fake candidates" by Lamm, Morris,
Pimentel, and their supporters during litigation,83 these candidates
used their statements to urge members to vote for contenders other
than the SUSPS-supported petition candidates.84 Taken together, the
defenses erected in response to the insurgents were quite significant.

78. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at exhibit D. The urgent election
notice and Mayhue article mentioned the possibility that the insurgents were using purchase
tactics as well, noting that some outside organizations were urging their supporters to join the
Club. Still, the primary focus was on identifying for members the danger posed by the
insurgents' persuasive tactic, nominating candidates interested in furthering "nonenvironmental" positions. See Briefs of Action of a Meeting of the Board of Directors, supra
note 72, at 2.
79. See Briefs of Action of a Meeting of the Board of Directors, supra note 72, at 3; see
also Drusha Mayhue, Outside Interests Push To Hijack Sierra Club, SIERRA CLUB CRIER, Feb.
2004, reprinted in First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at exhibit D.
80. See Groundswell Sierra, Background: 2005 Election for the Sierra Club's Board,
http://wvv.groundsvellsierra.org/background.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (describing
the organization's founding in 2004 to "mobiliz[e] Sierra Club members and publiciz[e]
background on the outside candidates seeking control of the Sierra Club Board" at that time).
81. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at exhibit B; Plaintiffs' Complaint for
Injunctive Relief; Declaratory Relief; Unfair Business Practices Under B & P Section 17200:
and Breach of Fiduciary Duty at 5-10, Lamm v. Fahn, No. 4428679 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 9,
2004) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Complaint, Lamm v. Fahn].
82. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at exhibit B (reproducing statements
of Dees, Berry and Herz).
83. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Lamm v. Fahn, supra note 81, at 5-10.
84. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at exhibit B (reproducing statements
of Dees, Berry and Herz). For example, Morris Dees's statement explicitly named Lamm,
Morris and Pimentel; Phillip Berry's statement asked members to "vote for only Nominating
Committee candidates, including Aumen, O'Connell and Renstrom"; and Barbara Herz's
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SUSPS wanted to dismantle these defenses, so Lamm, Morris
and Pimentel filed suit for relief.85 The Sierra Club's official policy of
neutrality in its director elections was the centerpiece of the
plaintiffs' arguments. The bylaws' default position prohibits the use
of Club resources to support or oppose candidates and bans
candidate advertising from Club publications.8 6 The bylaws further
dictate that articles or messages "about candidates" may appear in
the Club's national (or other) publications during the election
season only if all candidates are offered an opportunity to
participate. 87 Lamm, Morris, and Pimentel asserted that the actions
of the Club, through its board, officers, and staff, had flown in the
face of this neutrality policy. Thus, they sought an injunction against
further distribution of the urgent election notice and against
inclusion of the fake candidates on official election ballots.8 8 In
addition, they requested a declaration affirming that Club resources
could not be used to distribute messages regarding candidates
without the equal opportunity for participation by all candidates.8 9

statement advised that supporting Nominating Committee candidates was "the wisest course
in this election." Id.
85. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Lamm v. Fahn, supra note 81, at 1.
86. See Sierra Club Bylaws, supra note 49, SR. 5.6.1(a)(iii) (setting a default rule that
Club resources are not to be used to support particular candidates, though the default may be
varied by resolution or other provision in the bylaws or standing rules); id. SR. 5.6.1(d)
(prohibiting advertising for or against any candidates in Club publications); see also id. SR.
5.6.1(0 (prohibiting candidates from discussing their candidacies at meetings if they have
traveled to those meetings at Club expense).
The Lamm et al. complaint described the Club bylaws as prohibiting distribution of
candidate materials "at Club expense." Plaintiffs' Complaint, Lamm v. Fahn, supra note 81, at
3. Recent available versions of these bylaws do not contain this precise language. See Sierra
Club Bylaws, supra note 49; see also Sierra Club, Bylaws and Standing Rules of the Sierra Club
(July 20, 2005) (on file with author); Sierra Club, Bylaws and Standing Rules of the Sierra
Club (May 24, 2005) (on file with author). The current and available bylaws all do, however,
contain provisions establishing a general requirement of Club and board neutrality in the
election process, as cited above.
87. See Sierra Club Bylaws, supra note 49, SR. 5.6.1(c). The Bylaws make an exception
for "routine articles or messages" and explain that "[a]n article or message is 'routine' if it (A)
does not mention the fact that the author or subject is a candidate, (B) does not mention the
election, (C) relates to the candidates' performance of duties in an elected or appointed Sierra
Club capacity, (D) is timely for Club purposes, and (E) is sent or published only to members
who would normally receive similar articles or messages." Id.
88. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Lamm v. Fahn, supra note 81, at 13, 16-17.
89. See id. at 15-16. The complaint also claimed breach of fiduciary duty and unfair
business practices, all based on the same factual assertions. See id. at 13-14.
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Lamm, Morris, and Pimentel eventually dropped the case under
pressure,9" but it was picked up by another group of Club members,
organized as Club Members for an Honest Election (CMHE), which
soon filed its own complaint.9 This challenge included a demand for
an injunction against counting member votes and seating any
candidates in the election until after the court decided the case, as
well as disqualification of the so-called fake candidates.9 2 The court
denied CMHE's request for a preliminary injunction, finding that a
post-election challenge would suffice.9 3
The election thus went forward, resulting in record-setting voter
turnout and a decisive victory by Nominating Committee candidates.
Whereas in the past, ten percent or fewer of the Sierra Club's
members typically voted in annual elections, the 2004 election
attracted participation by over twenty-two percent of its members.94

90. See Request for Dismissal at 1, Lamm v. Fahn, No. 4428679 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb.
17, 2004). This pressure derived firom the Club's threat to invoke California's anti-SLAPP Act.
This statute provides for fee-shifting and a special motion to strike "[a] cause of action against
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or
free speech .. .in connection with a public issue," unless the plaintiff is deemed probable to
prevail. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West 2005).
The original plaintiffs' concerns may have been warranted. Although the new
plaintiff ultimately was permitted to litigate the election results, the Club succeeded in striking
some of the claims against it under the anti-SLAPP Act, and it secured a partial recovery of
attorneys' fees and costs. See Order Granting Sierra Club's Motion to Recover Attorney's Fees
and Costs, Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club at 2-3, No. 04-429277 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 27, 2005).
91. See Plaintiffs Complaint, for Injunctive Relief; Declaratory Relief; Unfair Business
Practices Under B & P Sections 17200; Violation of Corporations Code Sections 5520, 5523,
5615; Bylaw 5.4; Standing Rules 5-2-6(2), 5-2-6(3), and 5-2-9, Club Members for an Honest
Election v. Sierra Club, No. 04-429277 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2004). This Complaint was
first amended later that month and amended again the following September. See First
Amended Complaint, supranote 66; Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supranote 64.
92. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 66, at 11-16; Statement of Decision and
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment at 5-6, Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, No.
429277 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Statement of Decision and Order].
93. See Order Granting Sierra Club's Special Motion to Strike in Part and Denying in
Part and Denying Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction at 2-3, Club Members for
an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, No. 429277 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 11, 2004).
94. See Felicity Barringer, Establishment Candidates Defeat Challengers in Sierra Club
Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at A18; Terence Chea, Sierra Club Rejects Takeover,
LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Apr. 22, 2004, at Al; Martin, supra note 71, at Al; Sierra
Club, 2004 National Board of Directors Election Results (on file with author) [hereinafter
Election Results] (stating that the Club received back 171,616 of the 757,058 ballots it sent to
members).
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Moreover, Nominating Committee candidates prevailed by margins
of nearly ten to one.9" Faced with these numbers, CMHE filed an
amended complaint seeking to unseat the elected Nominating
Committee candidates.9 6
The complaint proceeded on dual tracks. It argued that the Club
had violated its own bylaws and California statutes by sending the
urgent election notice and permitting publication of the Mayhue
article.97 Further, it alleged that two Club directors had breached
their fiduciary duties by voting in favor of these measures.98 Again,
the plaintiffs argument turned on what it viewed as the Club's
obligation to remain neutral on election matters. In particular, the
plaintiffs claimed the Club's distribution of the urgent election
notice and the Mayhue article, each implicitly or explicitly critical of
SUSPS-supported candidates, violated the Club's internal election
rules against the use of Club resources to distribute messages about
candidates during election season.
The court's decision imposed little if any substantive scrutiny on
the board's chosen defensive measures. The court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the Club board was obligated to follow the internal
election rules expressed in its bylaws, but it deferred entirely to the
board's judgment on the meaning of those rules.9 9 The court's
designation of the board as the "final authority" on these matters
suggests that the board could fund or publish any statement about
select candidates, so long as the board itself deemed such statements
as outside the category of statements "'about' candidates."' 00 This
finding-that the bylaws' equal opportunity position applied only if
the board did not authorize deviation from it-significantly bolsters
the discretion afforded to the board in interpreting the Club's

95. See Douglas Fischer, Faction Opposing Immigration Loses Sierra Club Vote,
OAKLAND TRIB., Apr. 22, 2004; Martin, supra note 71, at Al; Election Results, supra note
94.
96. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, supra note 64, at 22. The complaint
specifically named Nick Aumen, Jan O'Connell, David Karpf, Sanjay Ranchod, and Lisa
Renstrom, who were all elected to the board by the membership. Id at 2. It also named Greg
Casini, who was appointed by the board after Aumen resigned. Id. The complaint requested
that the court unseat and replace Casini, along with the other four elected Committee
candidates still on the board at the time of the suit's filing. Id at 22.
97. Id. at 18-19.
98. Id. at 20.
99. See Statement of Decision and Order, supra note 92, at 8.
100. Id.
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election rules in the context of a takeover.'' As such, the court held
that the board had the authority to determine that the urgent
election notice and Mayhue article "were authorized efforts to
inform the Club membership about attempts by outside groups to
influence the election," rather than prohibited election-season
publications about candidates. °2 Thus, summary judgment for the
Club defendants was warranted. 0 3
Finally, the court considered and rejected the plaintiffs' claims
that the directors' defensive actions violated their fiduciary
obligations to the Club."0 4 The court did not view the "threat that
outside, non-environmental organizations posed to the Club's
election processes" as posing a potential conflict of interest for
directors, despite the fact that the incumbent directors had been
elected by the Club election process and supported current
candidates.' Rather, the court saw the takeover activity simply as a
legitimate threat to the organization, in response to which the
directors might take action. 0 6 Having rejected the possibility of a
conflict of interest, the court inquired only as to whether the
directors undertook their defensive measures with sufficient
information. Finding they had, the court held that their actions
warranted the protection of the deferential business judgment rule
and were legally valid. 0 7
SUSPS continued its efforts to change the Club's immigration
policies by running candidates in the 2005 board election, but these
efforts again were stymied. Freed from concerns about litigation, the
101. See id. The court did not, of course, create this ability to deviate sua sponte. The
Club bylaw prohibiting funding the support or opposition of candidates begins with the phrase
"[w]ithout authorization of the Board of Directors." Id. (quoting Sierra Club Bylaws at
Standing Rule 5-2-6(3)(a), though the language appears in Standing Rule 5.6.1(a)(iii) of the
current version of the Bylaws and Standing Rules).
102. Id. In support of the board's interpretation of its actions, the court noted a board
resolution passed in 1997. This resolution stated that nothing in its election rules would
"prohibit the Club from informing the membership of any attempt by non-Club entities to
influence its election." Id. at 9.
103. See id. at 9. Moreover, the court explained that the statutory violations CMHE
asserted were of discretionary, not mandatory, provisions of the corporate code and thus not
actionable. See id.
104. Seeid. at 10-11.
105. Id. at 10.
106. See id. at 10-11.
107. See id. at 11. As noted earlier, the Club also received a partial award of attorneys'
fees and costs. See supra note 90.
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Club took actions similar to those in the prior year's board fight but
seemed to take the SUSPS threat less seriously.1" 8 Ultimately, none
of the candidates SUSPS supported received substantial support.0 9
As currently composed, the board heavily favors a neutral stance on
the immigration question." 0 This fact, combined with the Sierra
Club court's deferential, incumbent-protective decision, seems likely
to hinder any future SUSPS takeover activities."'
This may seem to be the right outcome, or of little consequence,
if one interprets the facts to suggest that the Club membership
agrees with the incumbents' position. After all, members strongly
rebuffed SUSPS candidates' 2004 and 2005 election bids. Further,
when SUSPS put forward another pointed ballot question
advocating stricter U.S. immigration policy in 2005, it again lost
resoundingly." 2 Club members instead overwhelmingly voted to

108. See Felicity Barringer, Sierra Club Revisits Issue of Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 2005, at A17 ("Last year, the debate was tainted with allusions to racism and character
assassination, and although a taste of that vitriol was evident in interviews with the chief
combatants, the comments and the contest this year have a pro-forma feel."); see also Glen
Martin, San Francisco: Sierra Club Revisits Immigration Battle, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 2005,
at Bi; Sierra Club Stance, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 11, 2005, at A16; Kenneth R.
Weiss, Sierra Club Members Vote To Stay Neutral in the Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
26, 2005, at B3.
Groundswell Sierra, the group some Sierra Club members organized to oppose the
SUSPS-supported candidates in 2004, did take some additional steps in 2005, including
working with outside partners. For example, it asked Moveon.org to activate its network to
send email requests to its supporters affiliated with the Sierra Club to vote only for
"experienced Sierra Club candidates" that would not support anti-immigration policies. E-mail
from MoveOn.org to Linda Feldman (Mar. 31, 2005, 15:02) (on file with author).
109. See Weiss, supra note 108, at B3; Sierra Club, Board of Directors 2005 Official
Election Results (2005), http://www.sierraclub.org/bod/2005election [hereinafter 2005
Official Election Results]; see also Terence Chea, Sierra Club May Tackle Immigration,
VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Apr. 9, 2005, at 6 (noting candidates in 2005 election with SUSPS
support).
110. See Weiss, supra note 108, at B3 ("[T]he governing board of the 750,000-member
club is now aligned 12 to 3 against any kind of immigration crackdown. Those numbers ...
would make it impossible for immigration-control advocates to wrest control of the club ...
for at least two more annual elections.").
111. An appeal on procedural grounds resulted in an affirmance of the trial court's
orders. See Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818, 820
(2006), cert.granted, 139 P.3d 1169 (Cal. 2006).
112. See Weiss, supra note 108, at B3; see also 2005 Official Election Results, supra note
109; Groundswell Sierra Homepage, http://www.groundswellsierra.org (last visited Nov. 8,
2006).
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remain neutral on the immigration question." 3 Of course, at least
the election results might be viewed skeptically, as the board was
permitted to take actions to frustrate the candidacies of SUSPSsupported nominees.
Even if the incumbent-protective standard applied in the Sierra
Club case achieved the right outcome for that organization, one may
still question whether the adoption of such a deferential standard
might unacceptably chill the efforts of potential insurgent groups
within other nonprofits. This Article will turn to this question of the
best standard of review for general application to nonprofit takeover
situations in Part TV. First, however, it will recount another and
somewhat different example of nonprofit takeover activity, which
produced similarly hostile responses from incumbent fiduciaries and
the reviewing court.
B. Entryism at the Royal Society

14

Another useful case study of nonprofit takeover activity can be
drawn from the recent experience of the United Kingdom's Royal
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Although many
U.S. nonprofits have undoubtedly undergone takeover attempts, the
RSPCA battle offers an example of the use of purchase tactics by
insurgents and has the advantages of being pitched, highly
publicized, and ultimately the subject of a written judicial opinion.
Further, UK charity law is similar enough to that of the United

113. See Weiss, supra note 108, at B3; see also 2005 Official Election Results, supra note
109;
Sierra Club,
Planet
Newsletter:
Population
Ballot
Question
(2005),
http://www.sierraclub.org/planet/200502/election-background.asp;
Groundswell Sierra
Homepage, supra note 112.
114. Entryism is defined as "a political tactic in which an organisation or group enters a
larger organisation in an attempt to gain recruits, gain influence, or to take control of the
larger organisations' structure." SourceWatch, Entryism, http://www.sourcewatch.org/
index.php?title=Entryism (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). Entryism has also been used
disapprovingly to refer to "the activity of joining a political party with the secret intention of
changing its principles and plans." Cambridge Dictionaries Online, Cambridge Advanced
Learner's Dictionary, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=25937&dict-CALD
(last visited Nov. 8, 2006); Freesearch, Entryism, http://ww.freesearch.co.uk/
dictionary/entryism (last visited Nov. 8, 2006); see also Jane Kelly, Princess Anne and MeAnd Why I Despair of the RSPCA, DAILY MAIL (London), May 1, 2001, at 11 ("The
[RSPCA] has accused [Richard Meade] of 'entryism', a deliberate attempt to infiltrate and
change the society from within, rather similar to Militant Tendency's moves within the Labour
Party.").
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States to make the RSPCA story understandable to Americans and an
appropriate counterpart to the Sierra Club story."'
The RSPCA was founded in 1824 as the world's first animal
protection society." 6 It was incorporated by The RSPCA Act, a
special act of Parliament in 1932, with objectives "to promote
kindness and to prevent or suppress cruelty to animals and to do all
such lawful acts as the Society may consider to be conducive or
incidental to the attainment of those objects.""' 7 Today, the Society
has over 35,000 members"1 and engages in a wide range of animal
protection activities." 9 These include (1) organizing and operating a
corps of inspectors and animal care officers that rescue abused and
distressed animals, (2) maintaining a number of animal hospitals and
clinics, (3) running a large program to find new homes for
abandoned or victimized animals, and (4) conducting education and
advocacy around various animal welfare issues. 2 °
The original 1932 RSPCA Act, its later amendments, and the
RSPCA Rules together provide the governance structure for the
Society.' 2 ' The main governing body these authorities create is the

115. Trustees of charities in the UK are deemed fiduciaries and held to standards of
conduct accordingly. See Michael Carpenter, Strategy or Management by Trustees, in
CHARITIES, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW: THE WAY FORWARD 122, 126-27, 137-38 (Debra
Morris & Jean Warburton eds., 2003); see also John T. Hall & Rowan Ferguson, Case Study:
University of Anyplace: Strategic Legal Risk Review, 27 J.C. & U.L. 119, 121 (2000).
The UK's law of charities bears sufficient resemblance to that applicable in the
United States and makes the RSPCA example a reasonable one. However, the important
differences between the law and regulation of charities in the two countries should not be
discounted. A fuller discussion and comparison of these differences might be useful, but is
beyond the scope of this Article.
116. See Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), About the
RSPCA-History, http://www.rspca.org.uk (follow "ABOUT THE RSPCA" hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 8, 2006).
117. Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5,
c. 39, § 4 (Eng.) [hereinafter RSPCA Act of 1932].
118. See RSPCA, TRUSTEES' REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 5 (2005), available at
http://www.rspca.org.uk (follow "ABOUT THE RSPCA" hyperlink; then follow "Trustees
Report and Accounts" hyperlink; then follow "Trustees Report and Accounts" hyperlink)
(reporting 35,108 adult RSPCA members at end of 2005).
119. See, e.g., id. at 5-14.
120. See id.
121. See Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2,
c. 23 (Eng.); Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. 6,
c. 8 (Eng.); RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note 117; RSPCA Rules (2006), available at
http://www.rspca.org.uk/serviet/BobServer?blobtabe=RSPCABlob&blobcol=urlblob&blob
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Council, a twenty-five-person body of fiduciaries empowered to
manage the Society and elected by the membership.' 22 Membership
is relatively open. Applicants must submit a form containing "a
declaration of support for the objects of the Society," which form
must be accompanied by the relevant fee.' 2 3 The Council then, in its
"absolute discretion," can accept the member and enter his or her
name on the Society's registry of members. 4
Although the RSPCA does not employ democratic rhetoric to
the same degree as the Sierra Club, examples of the democratic ideal
can be found in its organic documents and public materials. In the
original RSPCA Act, the size of the membership and the fact that the
governing body of the Society was elected by its members were
stated as two of the principal justifications for granting it special
incorporation legislation. 2 ' Trustees' Reports have been careful to
point out that the RSPCA is "a membership charity" and at times
have emphasized the rights of voice that members have at the
Society's meetings.126 Moreover, in the course of the conflict over
takeover activities within the27 Society, its Chairman touted the
group's "democratic" nature.

key=id&blobwhere=- 116061668911&blobheader=application/pdf Introductory text to the
Rules explains:
The 1932 Act made provision for the Society to have Rules and the original Rules
are set out in the Schedule to the Act. The 1932 Act also made provision for the
Society to make changes to the Rules in accordance with procedures set out in the
Act. The 2006 edition contains the Rules, as amended by the Society since 1932
and, where necessary, confirmed by various Orders of the Charity Commissioners.
See id. at 2. Charities in England and Wales also are governed by two Charities Acts, those of
1992 and 1993. See Charities Act, 1993, c. 10 (Eng.); Charities Act, 1992, c. 41 (Eng.).
122. See RSPCA Rules, supra note 121, §§ 4-6. Fifteen Council members are directly
elected by the Society's members. See id. § 6. The other ten are elected by groups of local
branches organized into ten regions throughout the country. See id. §§ 5(1), 6(1), 6(6).
123. See id. §§ 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a). Ex-officio memberships are available to certain officers of
the Society's branches and junior memberships may be offered to individuals under age 18, but
these categories of membership do not entitle members to vote. See id. §§ 3(3), (5).
124. See id. §§ 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a).
125. See RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note 117, pmbl.
3, 4. The fact that its members
and "others who sympathise with its objects" support the Society's work also was mentioned in
this vein. See id. pmbl. 7.
126. See RSPCA, TRUSTEES' REPORT AND ACcoUNrs (2004) (on file with author). The
2005 Trustees' Report again stresses that the Society is "a membership charity," but does not
describe members' rights of vote or voice. RSPCA, TRUSTEES' REPORT AND ACCOUNTS, supra
note 118, at 5.
127. See, e.g., Andrew Pierce, Meade is Expelledfrom RSPCA, TIMES (London), June 15,
2001, at 5 (quoting Malcolm Phipps, Chairman of the RSPCA, saying, "The RSPCA is a
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The structure of the RSPCA also strongly indicates a
commitment to representative and relatively open governance. In
addition to electing their leaders, members are empowered to make
their positions and opinions known. To this latter end, the Council is
required to notice and hold a general meeting each year, at which
the members are presented the Council's annual report on the
Society and its financial statements. 28 At this meeting, the members
' 29
adopt the financial statements and annual report "if thought fit.'
Membership meetings also provide a forum at which Society
members may debate resolutions they propose. 3 ° These resolutions
are discussed and voted upon, provided proposed resolutions are
submitted to the Council in advance and the Council does not deem
discussion of them to be "detrimental to the interests of the
Society." 3' Recently, these structures for member empowerment

democratic organisation but clearly concerted efforts to join the society for any overriding
reason other than animal welfare makes a mockery of this democracy."); Mary Braid & Robert
Verkaik, Bloodsports: The Showjumper, the Author and a Fight for the Soul of the RSPCA,
INDEPENDENT (London), June 15, 2001, at 3 (similar); Stephen Rigley, Olympic Rider Meade
Is Expelled by RSPCA, DAILY MAIL (London), June 15, 2001, at 11 (similar).
128. See RSPCA Rules, supra note 121, § 17; see also RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note
117, sched. § XVII (original statutory provisions).
129. See RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note 117, sched. § XVII. (original statutory
provisions); RSPCA Rules, supra note 121, § 17. In addition, upon petition of at least five
hundred members, extraordinary general meetings of the society may be called and, if properly
called, must be noticed and held by the Council. See RSPCA Rules, supranote 121, §§ 19-20
(describing current requirements for calling and noticing extraordinary general meetings); see
also RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note 117, sched. §§ XIX, XX. (originally requiring requisition
of only 150 members for an extraordinary general meeting of the Society, describing original
notice requirement for annual and extraordinary general meetings of the Society, and setting
standards for notice by publication).
Early on, the Society's meetings were open to those even beyond the ranks of its
members. Subscribers, who had made some monetary donations but had not secured
membership, were welcome to attend annual and extraordinary general meetings, although
only members could vote. See RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note 117, sched. § XXII. Under the
current Rules, no provision is made for attendance by subscribers, but the Council is
empowered "to invite persons who are not members of the Society to attend and speak."
RSPCA Rules, supranote 121, sched. § XVII.
130. See RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note 117, sched. § XVII (original statutory
provision); RSPCA Rules, supra note 121, § 17.
131. RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note 117, sched. § XVII (original statutory provision)
RSPCA Rules, supra note 121, § 17. Interestingly, even after a resolution is passed at a Society
meeting, members may request a poll of the entire membership on the issue; a resolution
subjected to such a poll will not be deemed carried without receiving the votes of at least sixty
percent of those members voting on the poll. See RSPCA Act of 1932, supra note 117, sched.
§§ XXV-XXVII (original statutory provision); RSPCA Rules, supra, note 121, §§ 25-27.
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have been tested in an effort to determine the Society's position on
an extremely divisive issue in the United Kingdom: the continued
advisability of permitting sport hunting with dogs.
Despite its storied history in the United Kingdom, 132 during the
past several decades controversy has arisen over the wisdom of the
continuing legality of hunting with dogs in general, and foxhunting
in particular. After many decades of parliamentary debate over the
issue,'
it finally gained political traction after the Labour Party
decisively won the general election in 1997.' The manifesto on
which this victory was secured included promises to guarantee
greater wildlife protection and to obtain "a free vote in Parliament
on whether hunting with hounds should be banned."' 35 Still, the

132. See Three Centuries of Hunting Foxes, BBC NEWS, Sept. 16, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/422753.stm; Wikipedia, Fox Hunting, History, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foxhunting#History (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). The general sport of
hunting with dogs has roots in England even before the Roman invasion and was carried on
throughout the Roman and Norman periods, through to the near-present day. See Fox
Hunting, supra.
133. A 1970 bill to ban hare coursing passed the House of Commons but ran out of
legislative time when a general election was called. See Timeline: Hunting Row, BBC NEWS,
Feb. 17, 2005, http://nws.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukpolitics/1846577.stm. In addition, several
bills to abolish or limit hunting with dogs were proposed during the 1990s, but they never
made it through the parliamentary process to become law. See id.; see also Hunting Bill Goes to
the Dogs, BBC NEWS, July 3, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukpolitics/125475.stm
(noting a hunting bill was withdrawn on fears it would be used to talk out other, more
important bills); 223 PARL. DEB., H.C. (1993) 849, available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm 199293/cmhansrd/1993-04-27/Debate- 1 .html
(reporting
Tony
Banks's testimony that following his 1990 effort to pass a bill banning foxhunting, a Private
Member's Bill on the same subject was introduced but was defeated on its Second Reading).
134. See Warren Hoge, Britons Back LaborParty; Conservatives Are Routed After 18 Years
of Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1997, at Al ("The size of the Labor vote represented a
stunning rebuke of the Conservatives, long one of Europe's most powerful parties, particularly
at election time.").
135. Labour Party Manifesto of 1997 (1997), New Labour Because Britain Deserves
Better,
http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifestoshtml
("We will ensure greater protection for wildlife. We have advocated new measures to promote
animal welfare, including a free vote in Parliament on whether hunting with hounds should be
banned by legislation."). This position was not taken without some controversy.
The Labour Party's manifesto promised a "free vote in Parliament on whether
hunting with hounds should be banned by legislation." But after 300,000 people
demonstrated on London's streets, ministers appeared to backtrack. A Private
Members' Bill to ban hunting was dropped after the Government refused to support
it. But, when challenged on the issue late one evening in July, Mr. Blair swerved
again. The sport would be banned "as soon as we possibly can," he affirmed.
Editorial, Free the Fox Debate; Blair Should Set up an Independent Investigation on Hunting,
TIMES (London), Sept. 23, 1999, at 23.
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road to a decision on the foxhunting question was long and bumpy.
A bill banning hunting with dogs in England did not become law
until November 2004,136 with the ban ultimately taking effect in
February 2005.137
Just as the anti-hunting movement was gaining momentum, the
Society began an energetic campaign to advocate parliamentary
adoption of a ban on hunting with dogs.3 8 In 1996, the RSPCA

136. See Hunting Act, 2004, c. 37, §§ 1, 15 [hereinafter Hunting Act]; 426 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (2004) 1518, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/
cmhansrd/vo041118/debtext/41118-20.htm#41118-20-headO [hereinafter Royal Assent].
After continued opposition in the House of Lords plagued passage of a hunting ban passed by
the Commons, the Speaker invoked the limitations on the Lords' power to stymie legislation.
See The
U.K.
Parliament,
The
Parliament
Acts
of
1911
and
1949,
http://www.parliament.uk/works/parliament.cfm#parlacts (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). This
action finally allowed the ban to become law. See Hunting Act, supra; Royal Assent, supra.
137. See Hunting Act, supra note 136; News Release, Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs, Hunting Ban Starts Midnight Tonight, Feb. 17, 2005 (on file with
author). Various attempts to avoid the implementation of the ban through litigation were
unsuccessful, and the ban is now in place. See Jackson v. Attorney General, [2005] UKHL
(HL) 56, (2005) 4 All E.R. 1253 (dismissing appeal challenging lower court opinion that held
that the Hunting Act had been validly made under the 1949 Act); Countryside Alliance &
Others v. Attorney General, [2005] EWHC (Civ) 1677 (holding that the Hunting Act did not
infringe any rights under the European Convention on Human Rights); see also Hunt
Campaign Loses
Court
Battle,
BBC
NEWS,
July
29,
2005,
http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukpolitics/4728353.stm; Hunting: What Happens Next?, BBC NEWS,
Feb. 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/4215765.stm; Law Lords Stand by
Ban on
Hunting, BBC
NEWS,
Oct.
13,
2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/uk/4337604.stm.
Scotland imposed a ban on hunting with dogs somewhat earlier, in 2002. See
Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act, 2002, (AS.P. 6), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2OO2/20020006.htm.
138. The RSPCA did not always oppose hunting with dogs. See ARTHUR W. MOSS,
VALIANT CRUSADE: THE HISTORY OF THE R.S.P.C.A. 151-52 (1961) (explaining that in
1957, the RSPCA Council noted that although the RSPCA did not condone hunting for
sport, it declined to oppose fox hunting because it believed that alternative methods of killing
foxes caused the animals more suffering); Andrew Pierce, RSPCA to Oust Olympian Who Backs
Hunting, TIMES (London), Apr. 25, 2001 (stating that "three masters of foxhounds," among
others, formed the RSPCA in 1824); see also Huntfacts.com, Royal Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), http://www.huntfacts.com/RSPCA.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2006) (relating in a web article critical of the Society's anti-hunting stance that "[w]hen the
Labour government set up the Scott Henderson Inquiry [in the 1940s], the RSPCA supported
the continuation of foxhunting. The Society's stance was that it disapproved of all hunting for
sport, but it accepted that foxes must be controlled and that hunting was the least cruel
method" and that Richard Martin, a founding member of the RSPCA, hunted on his Irish
estate.). Yet, the Society came to embrace a position opposing hunting with dogs by 1976. See
Kelly, supra note 114, at 11; League Against Cruel Sports, About Us-History,
http://www.league.org.uk/content.aspCategorylD=1635&ArticleID=1681 (last visited Nov.
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joined the International Fund for Animal Welfare and the League
Against Cruel Sports to form Campaigning to Protect Hunted
Animals (CPHA), a group established to call on the government to
keep its promise to end hunting with dogs." 9 In addition to CPHA's
direct and grassroots lobbying efforts, 4 ° the Society's animal cruelty
investigations and prosecutions of individual hunters during the
1990s often were perceived as part of the larger RSPCA anti-hunting
agenda.14

As the Society's anti-hunting activity rose, pro-hunting
individuals began to join the RSPCA and organize the recruitment
of like-minded persons to join as well.' 42 Most well known among
these pro-hunting individuals was Richard Meade, an equestrian who
had won three Olympic gold medals for the UK in the 1960s and

8, 2006). Other than adopting this policy stance, however, the RSPCA did not become
particularly active on the hunting question until the 1990s.
The 1976 adoption of the policy opposing hunting with dogs also appears to have
come by way of member insurgency. See Kelly, supra note 114 (describing how, fueled by the
perception that the Council in the 1960s and early 1970s was dominated by hunters and hunt
supporters, anti-hunting advocates established a Reform Group to work for a policy reversal);
Huntfacts.com, supra (describing this process in a web article critical of the Society's antihunting stance); League Against Cruel Sports, supra (reporting the election of anti-hunting
candidates to the Society's Council in 1970).
139. See Campaigning To Protect Hunted Animals (CPHA), http://wvw.ifaw.org/
ifaw/dfiles/file_60.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
140. See INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE, SUBMISSION FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL
FUND
FOR
ANIMAL
WELFARE
9-10,
58
(2000),
http://

www.huntinginquiry.gov.uk/evidence/ifaw.pdf; RSPCA, SUBMISSION TO THE HUNTING
INQUIRY (2000), http://www.huntinginquiry.gov.uk/evidence/rspca.htm.
141. See, e.g., Horsewhip PairCleared by Judge; Hunt Case Blastfor RSPCA, DAILY MAIL
(London), July 15, 1993, at 25 ("Brian Toon, a spokesman for the Masters of Foxhounds
Association . . . said: 'We know the RSPCA is opposed to hunting and cases such as this
indicate to us the length the society appears to be willing to go in order to discredit
hunting."'); Benjamin Mancroft, A Huntsman Hounded Over Badger-Baiting; Benjamin
Mancroft Questions the Conviction this Week of a Hunt Master, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 4,
1993, at 23 ("It ... looks increasingly as if the RSPCA has little interest in pursuing bona fide
badger-baiters, preferring instead to waste money and court time in attempts to damage foxhunters, who do more for animal welfare and conservation than most so-called animal welfare
groups."); see also Huntfacts.com, supra note 138 (describing these RSPCA prosecutions of
"prominent hunting people" in a web article critical of the Society's anti-hunting stance).
142. See Jason Lewis, The Cunning Trick Tearing the RSPCA Apart in the Battle To Ban
Foxhunting, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), June 1, 1997, at 18 ("Over the past year hunters
and their backers have been enrolling in the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals' regional groups--a concerted attempt to build up a fifth column inside the powerful
charity.").
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1970s.143 Meade founded the Countryside Animal Welfare Group
(CAWG) in 1996 and began contacting hunting enthusiasts and
encouraging them to join the RSPCA.' 44 CAWG soon recruited
thousands of members, many of whom also became members of the
RSPCA."4 ' When another anti-hunting bill was proposed in 1997,
Meade sought support for RSPCA Council candidates that would
oppose it and urged CAWG supporters to "get involved with the
valuable work of the RSPCA."' 4 6 These tactics were characterized by
their proponents as attempts to "change things [at the RSPCA] from
within."' 4 7
The decision by hunting enthusiasts to join the RSPCA might
strike those uninitiated to the UK foxhunting debate as bizarre-if
not malevolent-on the theory that support for hunting must be
fundamentally at odds with the goals and concerns of an animal

143. See Clive Aslet, Horseman of the Apocalypse, INDEPENDENT (London), June 17,
2001, at 27 (reporting that Meade won one gold medal in 1968 and two gold medals in
1972); Equestrianism, Equestrian News from Olympics 2004, http://www.equestrianism.
net/olympics.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
144. See David Hencke, RSPCA Move To Block Hunt Takeover, GUARDIAN (London),
Apr. 15, 2000, at 1; Lewis, supra note 142, at 18; Marie Woolf, Fox Hunters Plot To Hijack
RSPCA's Annual Meeting, INDEPENDENT (London), June 20, 1999, at 4. CAWG describes
itself as follows:
The Countryside Animal Welfare Group (CAWG) is a group of more than
5,000 members of the RSPCA who support the objects of the Society but who are
concerned about the direction its policies have taken in recent years on a number of
animal welfare issues.
The Group was set up four years ago [in 1996] when the founding members
formed the view that the Society's excellent work in preventing unnecessary
suffering in domestic and other dependent animals was being compromised by the
diversion of money and other resources to issues that centered more on "animal
rights" than animal welfare. The founding members perceived that these policies
were based on sentiment rather than reason and failed to take into consideration the
special needs of animals in the wild.
THE COUNTRYSIDE ANIMAL WELFARE GROUP, SUBMISSION TO THE BURNS INQUIRY INTO

HUNTING WITH

DOGS

(2000),

http://www.huntinginquiry.gov.uk/evidence/cawg.htm

[hereinafter CAWG].
145. See Kelly, supra note 114, at 11 ("[Richard Meade] says he has recruited about
5,000 new country members [to join the RSPCA], a last-ditch attempt to stop the society from
becoming urban and radical."); see also Rob Evans & David Hencke, Pro-huntAlliance Funded
RSPCA Infiltrator,GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 28, 2001, at 6 ("[T]he Countryside Animal
Welfare Group, set up five years ago, consists of 5,000 RSPCA members who want to make
the charity support fox hunting.").
146. Lewis, supra note 142, at 18 (quoting a letter from Meade to CAWG supporters).
147. Id. (quoting an officer of the British Field Sports Society, an entity related to
CAWG).
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welfare group. But this is not the only way to interpret the CAWG
members' actions. These pro-hunting individuals viewed themselves
as hunters and animal welfare supporters. 4 ' As primarily residents of
the countryside, they expressed a commitment to animal welfare and
saw foxhunting as merely a well-established and humane method of
destroying dangerous vermin. Thus, they saw their views as in line
with the RSPCA's animal welfare agenda.
Still, like the SUSPS efforts at the Sierra Club, the actions by
Meade and his compatriots can be viewed as an unfriendly bid for
control of the policies of a nonprofit with member-elected
fiduciaries. The insurgents sought to obtain control of the Society in
order to change its anti-hunting policy. To do so, they looked to the
Society's membership as the route to desired control, rather than
negotiating with the Council. The CAWG bid for control primarily
employed purchase techniques. The insurgents encouraged prohunting individuals and advocates to make new applications to join
the Society.' 4 9 By this route, Meade and his fellows looked to swell
the ranks of RSPCA members with pro-hunting loyalists. Once
accomplished, the insurgents could count on these new members'
votes to achieve a change in the Society's anti-hunting policies, its
incumbent anti-hunting leadership, or both. However, Meade and
the CAWG insurgents were only able to pursue the early steps in this
multi-part takeover strategy before defensive measures were invoked
against them.
The RSPCA's 1999 annual member meeting became the venue
for the first face-off in this takeover attempt. The agenda included a
resolution, proposed by a Council member, that denounced
parliamentary maneuvers to block adoption of anti-hunting
legislation. 5 ° The resolution further requested that the government

148.

See CAWG, supra note 144; see also EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE WEST GROUP

BRANCH OF THE SOMERSET AND AVON NATIONAL FARMERS' UNION TO THE COMMITrEE OF

INQUIRY INTO HUNTING WITH DOGS (2000), http://www.huntinginquiry.gov.uk/evidence/
nfuwest.htm; WRITTEN SUBMISSION TO THE BURNS INQUIRY PREPARED BY BASKERVILLE,
HORGAN & PARTNERS EQUINE PRACTICE (2000), http://wwv.huntinginquiry.gov.uk/

evidence/baskerville.htm.
149. The CAWG campaign also used persuasive tactics to a degree. At times, it appealed
to existing RSPCA members to support changing the Society's anti-hunting policy in addition
to its attempts to augment the Society's membership with pro-hunting loyalists. However,
purchase tactics were the main techniques CAWG employed and the ones to which the
Council responded defensively.
150. See Woolf, supra note 144, at 4.
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revise parliamentary procedure to reduce the effectiveness of such
blocking methods.'' Pro-hunting members also proposed motions
for discussion at this meeting. Rather than calling directly for a
change of the Society's position opposing hunting with dogs, these
resolutions portrayed the Society as riven by an internal struggle
between traditional animal welfare supporters and animal rights
activists. Perhaps the most strident of these resolutions asked
members to vote to agree on the detrimental nature of "the growing
influence within the society of persons with extreme views of animal
rights."" 2 It called upon members to reject any efforts to exclude
from membership those "persons who . . . are deeply concerned
about animal welfare, [and] are part of a substantial body of opinion
which holds differing views as to the human relationship with
animals" and to request that the Council cease spending on lobbying
and instead concentrate on practical efforts to improve animal
welfare.' 3 If passed, the second resolution would have directed the
Council to bring to the attention of charity regulators the
"intrusion" of animal rights activists into the Society and their
attempts at subverting its "traditional objects."'5 4
CAWG vigorously campaigned to convince its followers who
were also RSPCA members to attend the annual meeting to oppose
the Council's motion and support the resolutions proposed by the
Days before the meeting, newspapers in
pro-hunting faction.'
London anticipated that up to seven hundred CAWG members
would attend the Society's annual general meeting-over twice the
typical expected RSPCA member attendance. 5 6 Ultimately, the more
than five hundred pro-hunting supporters who attended the meeting

151. See Charles Clover & Charlie Methven, Pro-hunt RSPCA Members Denied
aExtremist" Vote, ELECTRONIC TELEGRAPH (U.K.), June 25, 1999, http://wwv.telegraph.co.
uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=%2Farchive%2F999%2F06%2F25%2Fnrspca25 .html.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Another motion called for changes to the procedures for electing Council
members. See id.
155. See Carol Burns, RSPCA Is Expecting Disruption, LEICESTER MERCURY (U.K.),
June 23, 1999, at 23 ("Members of pro-hunting organisation Countryside Animal Welfare
Group plan to use their voting power at Saturday's meeting to force the [RSPCA] to back
down on its anti-blood sports policy.").
156. See Dawn Alford & Andrew Penman, Sorted: Outfox These Hunt Plotters; RSPCA
Sabotage, MIRROR (U.K.), June 25, 1999, at 8; Clover & Methven, supra note 151. Woolf,
supra note 144, at 4.
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were only able to debate and vote down the Council's resolution
opposing the procedural maneuverings of pro-hunting Members of
Parliament." 7 The Council refused to accept the other resolutions
for discussion on grounds that they could "be detrimental to the
interests of the Society."15 8 Still, the pro-hunting members were able
to achieve a partial victory, soundly defeating the Council-proposed
anti-hunting resolution by member vote.' 5 9
After this meeting, the Council's alarm about the pro-hunting
faction within its membership intensified, prompting the Council to
undertake defensive measures. The Society suspended membership
applications by hundreds of people in the months following the
1999 meeting, a move an RSPCA spokeswoman later described as
motivated by concern over "the damage being done to the society as
a result of CAWG's activities., 160 Soon after, the Council "took the
unusual step" of seeking input from the courts on its plans to cull
6
those it suspected of pro-hunt leanings from its membership rolls.1 '
In the press reports of the impending case, Meade and CAWG were
often accused of engaging in "entryism" 16 2-a disapproving British
term for joining a political party or group with the secret intention of
changing its positions. 163 The Society's official statements at the
157. See Clover & Methven, supra note 151; Hunt Issue Raises RSPCA Hackles, BBC
NEWS ONLINE, June 26, 1999, http://212.58.226.61/l/low/uk/379013.stm; The 1999
RSPCA Annual GeneralMeeting, WATCHDOG NEWSL., Sept. 1999, at 6 (on file with author).
158. RSPCA Rules, supra note 121, § 17. The RSPCA Rules specifically grant the
Council the right to refuse to accept member-submitted motions on these grounds. See id.
159. See John Arlidge, Pro-huntLobby Wins RSPCA Vote, OBSERVER, June 27, 1999.
160. Hencke, supra note 144, at 1; see also Rob Evans & David Hencke, Olympic Star
Expelled as Hunt Lobby Loses Battle for RSPCA, GUARDIAN (London), June 15, 2001, at 3
(quoting internal RSPCA document expressing concerns that a "surge in membership
applications in response to the campaigns run by Richard Meade . . . have damaged the best
interests of the charity").
161. See Hencke, supra note 144, at 1 (quoting an RSPCA spokeswoman who confirmed
that "[t]he RSPCA has started proceedings in the high court to seek guidance on the way in
which membership applications are to be handled and to clarify the relevant position of the
society's constitution").
162. See, e.g., Kevin Maguire, Pro-huntingJudges Cry off RSPCA Legal Fight, GUARDIAN
(London), Nov. 17, 2000, at 6 ("The RSPCA claims it is the victim of entryism, and senior
figures have privately accused the CAWG, led by Olympic equestrian Richard Meade, of
attempting a coup."); Charlotte Raven, Thank God for Peter Mandelson: Hunters Fall at First
Fence, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 30, 2001, at 9 ("[Members of CAWG] plan[ned] . . . to
infiltrate the larger body until there were enough of them to force it to change its position
.... Insane as this clearly is, you have to give points for the crazy audacity of using entryism to
turn something into its opposite.").
163. See supra note 114.
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time, as well as the drastic steps taken by the Council, demonstrate
the Council's fear of the threat that the pro-hunting group's
"organised infiltration" posed to the Society.'
In its request for an advisory judicial decision, the RSPCA
specifically sought counsel on whether it could lawfully adopt (1) a
Membership Policy ("Policy") that would enable it to remove or
exclude from membership those persons who had joined or sought
to join the Society in order to change its anti-hunting stance and (2)
a Membership Scheme ("Scheme") for implementing this Policy in
an administratively efficient fashion. 6 ' The Scheme excluded from
membership various categories of applicants or current members
based on characteristics suggesting the applicant or member desired
to join or had joined the Society in order to change its anti-hunting
policy. For example, the Scheme would preclude from membership
those individuals who applied using a form provided by CAWG or an
associated campaign.' 6 6 The Council asked the court to confirm both
that the Society's own rules would permit adoption and
implementation of these defenses and that adopting them would be
within the range of acceptable conduct for charity fiduciaries.' 67
As in the Sierra Club case, the judicial response was deferential
to the takeover concerns of the incumbents. The decision noted the
democratic nature of the Society's governance structure;168 yet, it
focused on the discretion over matters of membership conferred on
the Council under the RSPCA's internal rules. In reviewing the
proposed Policy, the court pointed to at least three different sets of
discretionary powers over membership that these rules grant the
164. Adam Lusher, Olympic Champion in Court Fight over RSPCA Hunt Ban, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 12, 2000, at 1 (quoting Charlotte Morrissey, of the RSPCA,
who also explained the Society was asking the court "to clarify what charities should do if they
believe they are subject to a damaging infiltration"); see also Hencke, supra note 144, at 1
(quoting the RSPCA's spokeswoman who cited concerns about CAWG activities within the
RSPCA).
165. See Royal Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Att'y Gen., [2001]
UKHRR (Ch) 905, (2002) 1 W.L.R. 448,451.
166. See id. at 464, 467-68.
167. See id. at 451. Although the Society's action was in the nature of a request for an
advisory decision, an adversarial hearing of the issues did occur. See id. at 453-60 (describing
the roles of the Attorney General, Richard Meade, and two applicants whose applications were
being held in abeyance, all as parties defendant).
168. See id. at 452 (citing the members' ability to "elect the council," "speak and express
their views" at membership meetings and in polls, and "vote in new members of the council
who will adopt different policies" if they disagree with the Council's actions or approach).
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Council. First, since completed membership applications are deemed
to establish applicants as members only when they are accepted, and
because such acceptance is at the absolute discretion of the Council,
the court found that the Council had broad freedom to accept or
deny initial membership applications.1 69 In addition, the court found
that the Council's "power to refuse and/or to return any
membership subscription at any time if the council shall be of the
opinion that it would not be advisable to accept or retain it"
provided the Council a route to eliminate a member's status during
the period of membership.1 70 Finally, the Council could exercise its
power to expel members using an explicit expulsion process. 71
The court held that each of these powers was separately available
to the Council, so that it might use the refusal/return power to strip
members of their memberships at any time, without recourse to the
express provision on expulsion.172 The refusal/return power,
however, was exercisable only upon compliance with the explicit
procedural safeguards its terms delineated: full consideration of the
issue by the Council, including a hearing of the relevant member's
views and passage of a Council resolution effecting the revocation of
3 Assuming these requirements were met, the Society's
membershipY.1
internal rule structure
would permit implementation of the proposed
74
defensive Policy.
The court then moved to the question of whether adoption of
the Policy would comply with Council members' obligations as
charity trustees. In finding that the Policy met these obligations, the
court employed a fiduciary standard requiring the Council to
exercise its powers "for the purposes for which they are conferred in
what they consider to be the best interests of the society" and in
good faith. 7 ' The judge did not blindly accept the Council's view
that excluding from membership those who sought to reverse the

169. See id. at 456-57,460.
170. Id. at 456, 459-61 (discussing RSPCA Rule § 3(7)); see also id. at 453-55
(describing the predecessor rules extending this power to the Council and stretching back to at
least 1932).
171. See id. at 456-57, 460-62 (discussing RSPCA Rule § 28).
172. See id. at 460-61.
173. See id. at 461.
174. See id. at 460-61.
175. See id. at 464-65 (emphasis added).
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Society's anti-hunting policy was in its best interest.17 6 Yet, he
accepted that the Council did "ha[ve] grounds (rightly or wrongly)"
for embracing the views it had, as well as for advocating the adoption
of the Policy.' 77 Thus, despite an obvious lack of enthusiasm for the
substance of the Council's decision, the judge upheld the Policy as
adopted honestly and in the good faith belief that it would serve
what the Council viewed as the best interests of the Society. 7 '
In contrast, the judge rejected the Council's proposed Scheme
for implementing its Policy. 79 Under the Scheme, if an applicant fell
within any of the categories identified with the pro-hunting
campaigns, his or her application could be conclusively refused, and
the applicant could be excluded from membership for the following
two years.' Likewise, if a current member fell within the categories
identified, life membership could be revoked upon return of the
member's subscription fee, or an annual member could be refused
renewal. 8 ' The court recognized the difficulty of investigating the
reasons behind every membership application received,' 82 but it
interpreted the Society's rules to require the Council's membershiprelated powers to be exercised on an individual rather than
categorical basis, and to provide substantial procedural safeguards for
members and applicants.' 8 3

176. See id. at 464 (noting the force of the argument that the Council had exaggerated or
overestimated the damage to the Society from the pro-hunting campaigns and questioning
whether removing pro-hunting members would in fact ease the tensions the hunting issue had
caused within the Society).
177. Id. at 464 (noting the Council's view that the Policy was in the Society's interest
because it would dampen organized pro-hunt activity against the RSPCA and keep
"troublemakers" out of the organization).
178. Id. at 465-66. The court also found the Council's implementation of the Policy not
to interdict the guarantees of individual free speech under the UK Human Rights Act. See id.
at 466-67.
179. See id. at 468.
180. See id. at 467-68.
181. See id. at 457,467-68.
182. See id. at 467.
183. See id. at 468-69. The level of procedural safeguards required varies by context. The
Council may refuse to accept initial applications for membership using the categories of
exclusion as prima facie evidence of grounds for rejection, but it must inform applicants of this
practice, invite them to state whether they fall into these categories, and give any reasons why
they should be admitted as members regardless. See id. at 468-69. Life or annual members
who would be stripped of membership or have their membership renewals refused are entitled
to greater procedural protection. See id. at 468. The Council must consider fully, in each
individual member's case, whether it would be "inadvisable" to continue the membership at
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Because the judge grounded his decision regarding the Scheme
on an interpretation of the Society's internal rules, his decision did
not evaluate the Council's choice to adopt the Scheme in relation to
any particular standard of fiduciary conduct. The judge did criticize
the Council's singular focus on the hunting issue 184 and noted the
practical and potentially large costs of any scheme to implement the
Policy. 8 5 In fact, he suggested the benefits of stripping membership
would rarely, if ever, justify the costs of complying with the necessary
procedures to do so.'8 6 Still, these doubts appear to surface from a
pure utilitarian calculus rather than a concept of fiduciary obligation
or the requirements of charity law. The decision falls short of
suggesting that such defenses could not lawfully be adopted. Instead,
it informs fiduciaries of the appropriate range of considerations they
should evaluate in order to successfully craft and implement defenses
of this type.
The court's fairly deferential, incumbent-protective response to
the allegations of a takeover attempt at the RSPCA heartened the
Council. On the heels of the court's decision, the Council rejected
five hundred membership applications from applicants it believed
sought to join the Society to oppose its anti-hunting position.' 87
Moreover, after considering its legal options, the Council decided to

issue. See id. Moreover, each member must be given the opportunity to respond to any
allegations against him. See id. at 469.
184. See id. at 467-68 (questioning whether the "single factor" of a desire to oppose the
Society's anti-hunting policy or participation in a campaign should "justif~y] th[e] extreme
course" of denying or revoking membership and noting that countervailing circumstances
should be borne in mind).
185. See id. at 469-70 (specifying the potential for the Society to lose the future gifts and
legacies of entire classes of possible members, which donations are a much more important
source of income to the Society than are membership dues, as well as the serious and
detrimental public image and reputation effects mass exclusions could have on the RSPCA).
186. See id. at 469.
187. Matthew Beard, RSPCA Battles To Oust Pro-hunting Olympian, INDEPENDENT
(London), Apr. 26, 2001, at 12 ("[T]he society rejected 500 membership applications from
people accused of being part of an infiltration campaign by pro-hunt supporters."); Pierce,
supra note 138 (noting that the RSPCA had turned down 500 membership applications);
Robert Verkaik, 'Rumpole' Comes out of Retirement for RSPCA Case, INDEPENDENT
(London), June 13, 2001 ("In April, the society announced that it had rejected 500 of 600
applications that had been held in abeyance after the court's ruling."); Jo Willey, Showjumper's
Shock over Possible RSPCA Ban, PREss ASS'N NEWS, Apr. 25, 2001 ("The society barred 500
people it claimed were pro-hunt infiltrators earlier this month after a judge granted it
permission to bar pro-hunt campaigners it believed were 'infiltrators' trying to change its
policy on blood sports.").
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expel Meade from the ranks of its members. 8 ' After an expensive
and highly public inquiry, the Council expelled him in June 2001 .189
Meade has continued to advance his position that he and other
hunting supporters were wrongly excluded from participation in
framing the Society's hunting stance. 9 ' Concern over the hunting
issue has continued to cause conflict within the RSPCA, including an
unsuccessful Council run by a hunting enthusiast' 9' and backlash
from some members after the appointment of an anti-hunting
activist and former MP as the Society's new Chief Executive. 192 Yet,
with the support of the RSPCA holding, the Council is unlikely to
reconsider its position that it must defend the Society's
"democracy" 1 93 from future perceived infiltrations.

188. Andrew Pierce, Meade Will Not Fight RSPCA Ban, TIMES (London), May 7, 2001
(explaining that the RSPCA Council sent Richard Meade an eighty- four-page summons
requesting that he appear at a disciplinary hearing on May 27); Pierce, supra note 138 ("The
RSPCA will today begin unprecedented moves to terminate the membership of its most
prestigious supporter, Richard Meade . . ." ). Perhaps the Council did take some of the
judge's concerns to heart; it did opt to expel Meade, rather than stripping his membership
using the refusal/return rule procedures outlined in the judge's decision. See Braid & Verkaik,
supra note 127, at 3; Olympic Horseman Expelled by RSPCA, JOURNAL (U.K.), June 15, 2001,
at 12.
189. See Pierce, supra note 127, at 5 ("At a private hearing in London, the 25-strong
council of the animal charity expelled Mr. Meade ....");Braid & Verkaik, supra note 127, at
3; Evans & Hencke, supra note 160, at 3; Tom Kelly & Vanessa Allen, RSPCA Expels
Showjumper for Supporting Fox Hunting, PRESS ASS'N NEWS, June 15, 2001; Olympic
Horseman, supra note 188, at 12.
190. See Braid & Verkaik, supranote 127, at 3 ("Yesterday [Richard Meade] insisted that
the society was stifling the right to express an opinion."); Danny Kemp, Meade Blames
'Militants'forRSPCA Expulsion, PRESS ASS'N NEWS, June 15, 2001 (discussing a number of
Richard Meade's concerns about his expulsion).
191. See James Morrison, The Gameshow Host, Her Neigbbour the Huntsman and a Crowd
Baying for Blood, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 10, 2002, at 5 ("The 59-year old farmer
[Alex Mason] hopes to be voted on to the [RSPCA's] 25-strong ruling council in an attempt
to challenge its longstanding opposition to blood sports."); RSPCA Snubs Fox Hunt
Supporters, GLOUCESTERSHIRE ECHO (U.K.), July 1, 2002 (noting that Mr. Mason's run was
unsuccessful).
192. See Richard Alleyne, New RSPCA Chief Promises To Provide a Stronger Edge, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 22, 2002, at 12 ("[H]ours after her acceptance, a dispute broke
out over whether her employment moved the society further away from animal welfare and
towards political campaigning.").
193. See Pierce supra note 127 (noting the RSPCA Chairman's widely quoted statement
that "[t]he RSPCA is a democratic organization but clearly concerted efforts to join the society
for any overriding reason other than animal welfare makes a mockery of this democracy").
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The Sierra Club and RSPCA experiences illustrate the deeply-felt
concerns on all sides of nonprofit takeover activities.'
Insurgent
groups fight avidly to move or restore the target nonprofit to what
they view as the appropriate policies to support its mission.
Incumbent fiduciaries see their obligation as no less than defending
their organization and its mission from ruin. Such concerns require
that judicial review of nonprofit takeover defenses be carefully drawn
to address the needs of affected organizations and the nonprofit
sector generally. Ad hoc responses to the exigencies of particular
takeover battles are inadequate in this context. The next Part
considers various approaches courts might take to regulate this
highly imperfect market for mission control.' 95

194. Certainly these high-profile takeover attempts are not the only situations in which an
individual or group has engaged in an unfriendly nonprofit takeover attempt. Nonprofit
corporations with member-elected boards of all sizes and types can, and undoubtedly have,
experienced attempts to modify their programs and policies by replacing board personnel or
altering the composition of the membership entitled to elect them. See, e.g., Brennan v. Minn.
Soc'y for the Blind, 282 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 1979) (holding invalid a bylaw attempting to
terminate the society's membership structure, which directors passed in order to thwart a
feared takeover attempt); Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v. Congregation B'nai Jacob, 686 N.E.2d
1330 (N.Y. 1997) (describing a longstanding battle between factions of a synagogue waged, in
part, through attempts to alter membership composition); Complaint at 1-7, Olson v. Auto.
Club of S. Cal., No. BC244326 (Cal. Super. Feb. 1, 2001) (claiming incumbent directors of
auto club were frustrating election bids of insurgent candidates who sought to move the Club
to advocate reductions in gasoline taxes and automobile registration fees); Editorial, Dissidents
at Dartmouth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at A14 (describing the success of petition-nominees
in gaining seats on Dartmouth's partially member-elected Board of Trustees and claiming
incumbents' response has been an attempt to alter Board composition policy). There is also a
long history of cases brought to resolve disputes within churches and among their members.
See, e.g., Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. (1 Tyng) 488 (1820); Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the
Tribunal:JudicialResolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1378 (1981). As
reviewing takeover activity within these organizations may raise unique constitutional and
other issues, this article brackets the question of takeovers in the religious context.
195. Of course, judicial review of defenses is not the only means by which the law might
regulate nonprofit takeover activity. Rather than proceeding directly to court, frustrated
insurgents or nervous incumbents might contact the attorney general for guidance or support.
In such instances, however, the approach taken by courts to reviewing defenses could provide a
useful framework for attorney general advice or action.
Alternatively, legislation, or some other rules-based effort, might be launched at the
problem. State legislatures or attorneys general might draft more specific rules to regulate
nonprofit membership or elections. A rules-based approach might also be promulgated by selfregulatory organizations. Such statutes or rules could describe proper and improper activities
for insurgents and incumbents in takeover situations, thereby obviating or reducing the need
for case-by-case judicial review. At the moment, however, there seems to be neither the
political will nor the private resources to support such a rulemaking effort.
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IV. SELECTING A STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR NONPROFIT
TAKEOVER DEFENSES

The legal limitations, if any, on the defensive strategies
incumbent nonprofit fiduciaries may use to frustrate takeover
attempts will channel the conduct of those facing such efforts and
should mesh with the values and policies underlying nonprofit law.
Even though few takeover attempts will be characterized by
sufficient rancor and resources to wind up in court, those that do will
provide valuable guidance for directors of smaller, more resourcestrapped or litigation-shy organizations. Further, the standard courts
impose for the conduct of directors in this context forms part of the
larger picture of the responsibilities these fiduciaries owe to their
nonprofits and their various stakeholders. To the greatest extent
possible, this picture should be consistent and rational, and should
reinforce the ideals of the nonprofit sector.
The courts' rulings in Sierra Club and RSPCA ostensibly deal
with both the procedural and substantive dimensions of the takeover
defense issue. On the procedural front, both courts hold that
directors are required to comply with their nonprofits' internal
election and membership rules in defending against takeover activity.
To varying degrees, they then analyze fiduciaries' conduct to
determine whether the incumbents in each scenario have indeed
followed their own internal rules.'9 6 Although one might take issue
with the Sierra Club court's extreme deference to the Club's
directors on this question, this baseline of procedural compliance
required by current law certainly is wise. It reminds nonprofit
fiduciaries that their organizations are not fiefdoms, but legal entities
governed by organic documents that impose real and mandatory
limits on their actions. This "rule of law" lesson underpins the
legitimacy of the fiduciary construct and bolsters member and public
trust in individual organizations and the nonprofit sector by
reminding them that fiduciary action cannot be entirely arbitrary.
Thus, any standard developed to review defensive actions taken by

196. See Statement of Decision and Order, supra note 92, at 7-8 (finding that the Sierra
Club board acted in accord with its own bylaws); Royal Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Att'y Gen., [2001] UKHRR (Ch) 905, (2002) 1 W.L.R. 448, 462, 463-70
(finding that the Society's Rules confer upon the Council the right to reject applications for
membership and remove current membership, and reviewing the Membership Policy and
Scheme for compliance with the Rules' requirements for exercising those powers).
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nonprofit fiduciaries should retain the baseline procedural
requirement that they follow the internal rules of their own
organizations.
But even if a board is found to comply with the election and
membership processes imposed by its organic documents (and that
incumbent fiduciaries may have written), there remains the
substantive question of whether boards have breached their fiduciary
obligations in their attempts to frustrate a current or brewing
takeover attempt. When dealing with fiduciaries, technical
compliance with legal rules, externally- or internally-imposed, is not
the sole standard of conduct.'9 7 Such compliance is necessary, but for
courts to uphold director actions taken to thwart a takeover, more
may be required. The question of whether, and to what extent, the
law imposes substantive limits on defensive actions remains open.
Moreover, this question is much more difficult to resolve than the
procedural one, as it is linked to the central and thorny issue of how
and by whom nonprofit mission should be defined.
This Part begins consideration of this open question by
evaluating three types of standards courts reviewing defensive actions
by nonprofit fiduciaries could implement: incumbent-protective
standards, insurgent-protective
standards,
and intermediate
standards. Ultimately, it advocates the addition of an intermediate,
governance-protective standard of review to the current baseline
requirement of procedural compliance. Such a standard harmonizes
the competing nonprofit policy goals of mission preservation and
evolution, while reinforcing the democratic governance choice that
nonprofits with member-elected fiduciaries have made.
A. Incumbent-ProtectiveStandards
As the Sierra Club and RSPCA rulings aptly demonstrate, courts
can apply incumbent-protective standards to review nonprofit
197. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) ("[A fiduciary] cannot use his
power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no
matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy
technical requirements."); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)
(similarly noting that technical compliance with the law is not sufficient to show compliance
with fiduciary obligations); Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners, LLC, No. 19477, 2002 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 38, at 15-16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) ("These actions do not appear to be those
of fiduciaries acting in good faith. As the Supreme Court and this Court have made clear, it is
not an unassailable defense to say that what was done was in technical compliance with the
law.").
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takeover defenses. The most extreme of such standards would
require procedural compliance alone-removing any threat of
challenge to defensive actions, so long as they comply with the
technical requirements of internal election or membership rules. Less
extreme (though still deferential) substantive standards also would
protect most attempts to frustrate insurgents' efforts. For example,
one such standard might endorse director conduct in takeover
situations so long as directors comply with internal rules and can cite
a rational explanation for their actions. Placing the burden on
insurgents to disprove the existence of such a rational explanation
would make it even more difficult for them to challenge defensive
actions successfully.
Although neither the Sierra Club nor the RSPCA court provided
a general statement of the substantive standard to be employed in
reviewing all directors' responses to nonprofit takeover activity, both
decisions have a decidedly incumbent-protective cast. In Sierra Club,
the court found no evidence of a conflict of interest that might elicit
duty of loyalty-type concerns and a concomitant rigorous substantive
standard of review.'98 Likewise, it found that the defendants were
entitled to the protection of the deferential business judgment rule
in reviewing their compliance with their fiduciary duties. 99 This
standard of review precludes a court from engaging in a substantive
review of directors' decisions, unless those decisions amount to gross
negligence."'
In RSPCA, the court considered whether the Council members
adopted the Membership Policy in compliance with their fiduciary
obligations as charity trustees. The court described the substantive
standard it employed as merely requiring the Council members to
exercise their powers "for the purposes for which they are conferred
in what they consider to be the best interest of the Society" and in
good faith.2"' In applying this deferential and subjective standard, the
court required the defendant fiduciaries to show only that they
honestly believed they were acting in the Society's best interest. The
court noted its own hesitations about the wisdom of the Council's
198. See Statement of Decision and Order, supra note 92, at 10.
199. See id. at 11.
200. See GEVURTZ, supra note 15, § 4.1.2(d) (characterizing Delaware's application of
the business judgment rule as a gross negligence standard).
201. Royal Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 1 W.L.R. at 465 (emphasis
added).
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position, namely that it was important to exclude pro-hunt
individuals from membership in the Society. 2°2 Still, the court upheld
the Policy because it accepted that the Council members held this
position honestly and in good faith. 2 3 The RSPCA court did strike
down the Council's proposed Membership Scheme. However, this
decision was based on a finding that the Scheme failed to comply
with procedural safeguards set down by the Society's own rules,
rather than on a finding of fiduciary breach. 2" Both the Sierra Club
and RSPCA decisions exemplify an incumbent-protective approach.
Their deferential style leaves fiduciaries considerable leeway to
frustrate potential insurgents and internal factions engaged in
takeover activity.
One explanation for the appeal of incumbent-protective
standards is that they respond to the seemingly extreme nature of the
changes in mission that insurgents in cases like Sierra Club and
RSPCA desire to make. On initial observation, the intent to move
the Sierra Club, a group associated with progressive political views,
to an anti-immigration position may strike the observer as quite
radical. Likewise, the intention of insurgents at the RSPCA to back
away from the group's opposition to hunting with dogs may seem
discordant with the ideals associated with an animal welfare society.
The proponents of these positions can make arguments that cast
them as appropriate evolutions of the general mission of the
organizations: immigration stresses the ecosystem and should be
limited, and hunting vermin with dogs is less harmful to these
animals than other techniques required to control them. Yet, upon
hearing the facts of the cases, one experiences a sense of sympathy
for incumbent fiduciaries who claim they are protecting their groups
from those who seek to destroy their ideals. Viewed in this light,
incumbent-protective standards can appear quite attractive.
As such, incumbent-protective standards, which likely would
prevent the revision of nonprofit missions through takeovers, seem
to dovetail nicely with some of the established ideals of the nonprofit
sector and nonprofit law. Charities have long been engaged in the

202. See id. at 464.
203. Id. at 464-65.
204. See id. at 468-70.
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preservation of historic norms, values, and even objects.2"'
"Voluntary action and voluntary organizations have played a major
role in history in preserving values, ways of life, ideas, beliefs,
artifacts, and other productions of the mind, heart, and hand of man
from earlier times so that this great variety of human culture is not
lost to future generations." ' This ability to preserve and reinforce
treasured values is one of the rationales for the existence and
privileged status of the sector.2" 7 Given this solicitude for
preservation, shielding nonprofit fiduciaries from change with an
incumbent-protective standard seems fitting.
This concern for preservation is bolstered by, and perhaps related
to, charity law's tradition of strong respect for original intent. In
nonprofits organized as charitable trusts, trustees must follow the
stated intentions and purposes of the donor long after the donor's
contribution.20 8 In fact, as one of the principal benefits of charitable
trust status is perpetual life, this fidelity to original intentions and
purposes theoretically will persist indefinitely. °9 When circumstances
change such that charitable trustees desire to alter their trust's
activities, those trustees must seek extraordinary permission to do so
in court.210 Courts, under the cy pres doctrine, will permit such
change only if the donor's intended purposes have become
impossible or highly impracticable to accomplish.2"1' Moreover,
traditionally, even if this high bar is met, any revised ends must come

205. See O'NEILL, supra note 6, at 36-37 (stating that anthropological work that has
found associations arose even in ancient societies and often served to preserve the values of a
group or tribe after it had experienced social change or dislocation).
206. Smith, supra note 7, at 82.
207. See O'NEILL, supra note 6, at 36-37, 42, 45 (noting that this strain of nonprofit
theories developed in various disciplines); SALAMON, supra note 9, at 14-16 (describing the
nonprofit sector's role in value guardianship as one of the four key functions of the nonprofit
sector and linking this function to the sector's contributions to societal diversity); Lester M.
Salamon, The Resilient Sector, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 10, 10-11 (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 2002) (similarly describing important expressive and value-guarding roles played
by nonprofits); Smith, supra note 7, at 82-83.
208. See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, SCOTT ON
TRUSTS §§ 365, 379 (4th ed. 1989) (explaining that charitable trusts may persist indefinitely
and that charitable trustees are duty-bound to pursue their trusts' purposes).
209. See id.
210. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 413 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 294 (Supp. 2006);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
211. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 413; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67.
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"as near as possible" to those desired by the donor.212 Today, cy pres
and the desire to protect donor or original intent often exert
influence over changes in the use of assets by nonprofit corporations
as well. 2 3 The tendency of nonprofit law to protect original intent
seems to augur well for adoption of incumbent-protective standards,
which would enable present fiduciaries to avert changes advocated by
insurgents.1 4
The downside of incumbent-protective standards is the damage
they inflict on internal democracy within nonprofits with members.
If an incumbent-protective standard were to become the established
precedent, nonprofit directors facing takeover attempts essentially
could take a no-holds barred approach to preventing such
insurgencies. Incensed insurgents seeking mission change would be
bereft of options to shift organizations from within. They could
pursue their favored mission only by leaving the organization and
joining alternative groups. One might not necessarily view this as an
undesirable outcome; after all, this is precisely the situation faced by
those who seek unsuccessfully to convince the leaders of nonprofits
with self-perpetuating boards to transform their missions. However,
the takeover phenomenon this Article addresses occurs only in
nonprofits that have opted for a member-elected fiduciary structure.
212. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67(d) ("In applying the cy pres doctrine, it is
sometimes stated that the property must be applied to a purpose as near as possible to that
designated by the terms of the intended trust."). Modern courts have moderated this extreme
deference to the donor's intent but remain committed to finding purposes close to those in the
donor's mind. See id. ("Increasingly . . . courts have recognized (as does the rule of this
Section) that the substitute or supplementary purpose need not be the nearest possible but one
reasonably similar or close to the settlor's designated purpose, or 'falling within the general
charitable purpose' of the settlor.").
213. See Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead 18-19 (Oct. 4, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (addressing enforcement of restricted gifts to
corporate charities in the context of a discussion on donor standing); Brody, supra note 4, at
4-15 (exploring the ways courts and charity regulators have addressed the question of when
and how corporate charities may change the use of their assets, including some applications of
cypres and other doctrines focused on preserving donor intent). One commentator has dubbed
as "trust law parallelism" the adaptation of two trust law concepts to nonprofit corporate
entities-obligating directors to adhere more closely to their organization's original mission
and limiting the organization's ability to use unrestricted donations for newly adopted
purposes. Katz, supra note 5, at 698-703.
214. Insurgents may make the argument that it is they who represent the established
mission of the organization and that their takeover activity is designed to return the
organization to its original purposes and activities. When arguing that their vision represents
the original or established purposes of an organization, however, incumbents generally will
have the powerful facts of current and recent practice on their side.
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Allowing incumbents wide latitude to frustrate insurgents' bids for
leadership positions undermines the idea of a democratic governance
structure to which these nonprofits have explicitly committed.2"'
Furthermore, the fact that frustrated insurgents can establish
alternative groups does nothing to force the trapped assets inside a
nonprofit toward what might be more desirable uses, if only a
transformation of mission could legitimately be achieved.
B. Insurgent-ProtectiveStandards
At the other extreme, courts considering the conduct of
fiduciaries facing imminent or future takeovers might demand
conformity with an insurgent-protective standard of substantive
review. Beyond mere technical compliance with organizational rules,
such standards would require courts to evaluate the merit of using
these rules to frustrate members' ability to communicate or make
changes to a nonprofit's policies and mission. Insurgent-protective
standards likely would impose on directors the burden of persuading
the court on this issue. These standards would empower takeover
insurgents and warn off many incumbent directors' attempts to
thwart them.
The most insurgent-protective standard possible would simply
deem invalid any action by directors designed to frustrate takeover
activity, essentially assigning directors an insurmountable burden of
proof.2 16 So long as the consequence of preventing takeover attempts
or preparations was shown (or perhaps not disproved), directors
would have no defense. This standard would ensure the courts'
assistance to insurgents if they could provide evidence that directors
had acted to stymie an immediate or looming takeover attempt. In
addition, it would send a clear message to member-elected fiduciaries
that they cannot use their control over the election or membership
apparatus to prevent shifts in their nonprofits' missions. Of course, it
also would be quite extreme, cutting off essentially all board
215. See infra Part IV.C (arguing for a standard that will prevent the choice of
democratic nonprofit governance from operating as a mere sham and will hold nonprofits with
member-elected boards to their frequent democratic rhetoric).
216. Easterbrook and Fischel advanced a rule similarly demanding "manager passivity" in
the for-profit takeover context. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a
Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1164, 119495 (1981). U.S. courts, however, have not adopted this kind of wholly insurgent-protective
standard in the for-profit arena.
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discretion in dealing with potentially serious threats to nonprofit
organizations.
A less radical, but still highly insurgent-protective, standard
could be adapted from that applied to for-profit directors'
interference with the shareholder franchise under Blasius v. Atlas
Corp. and its progeny. 217 In Blasius, the directors of a for-profit
corporation adopted a bylaw that increased the size of the board and
selected candidates to fill those interim vacancies, all to frustrate an
attempt by a substantial shareholder to gain a board majority." 8
Both the passage of the director-enacted bylaw and the selection of
interim directors were done in compliance with the internal rules of
the corporation and statutory requirements for such action.219
However, the Delaware Chancery Court voided the directors' action
because it was taken "for the primary purpose of impeding the
exercise of stockholder voting power," and the directors could not
show a "compelling justification for such action."22 The directors
could not meet this high bar simply by arguing that they were more
217. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (adopting a
"compelling justification" standard for reviewing board actions undertaken primarily for the
purpose of frustrating shareholder voting); see also MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d
1118, 1128-31 (Del. 2003) (applying Blasius review within a consideration of takeover
defenses).
In reviewing for-profit analogies, this Article focuses on Delaware, as it has the most
highly developed case law on director responsibilities in the takeover context. See GEVURTZ,
supra note 15, § 7.3 (noting the dominance of Delaware's takeover defense jurisprudence as a
result of "Delaware's prominence as the state of incorporation of most of the companies
involved in the major takeover battles."). For-profit takeover law from other nations may be
another fertile source for insurgent-protective standards. For example, in the UK, incumbent
directors are essentially prohibited from taking defensive action in response to external
attempts to acquire their companies' shares. See TAKEOVER CODE, R. 21.1 (2006), available
at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/codesars/DATA%5Ccode.pdf
(prohibiting
incumbent boards from "tak[ing] action which may result in an offer or a bona fide possible
offer being frustrated"). Interestingly, this available, insurgent-protective body of rules was not
considered by the judge in RSPCA.
218. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 654-55. The board justified its actions as necessary to
prevent the shareholder from using the majority he might acquire through a consent
solicitation to push through a leveraged recapitalization plan, which the board viewed as
extremely dangerous. Id. at 655.
219. See id. at 653-56; Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years
After Professor Cary's Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 511 (2000) ("[The Atlas board's]
defensive actions were consistent with the Delaware statute and Atlas's bylaws. Nonetheless,
the Delaware court enjoined the action, opining that, although legal, the actions of the Atlas
board unduly interfered with the shareholder voting process, and the board's action was
therefore set aside." (citing Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663)).
220. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.
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capable than shareholders of deciding on governance arrangements
within their corporation.22 1 This "compelling justification" standard
is one of the most stringent forms of scrutiny for reviewing for-profit
directorial action. 222
The Delaware courts view this significant level of protection for
shareholders' franchise as critical to maintaining the legitimacy of the
corporate democracy. 223 Under the for-profit corporate governance
structure, shareholders consent to control over their investments by
directors and other fiduciaries and agents. This consent, however, is
subject to the shareholders' power to replace directors (and, through
them, officers and agents) during directorial elections. If the
shareholders' will to replace a board can be thwarted by the very
directors who fear ouster for anything less than a compelling reason,
one of their few powers to hold directors accountable is seriously
undermined.
One can easily imagine importing this standard to the nonprofit
takeover defense context. Directors faced with a challenge to
defensive actions they undertook to frustrate an insurgent candidate
or faction might be required to show a compelling justification for
their actions, at least, so long as those actions were taken primarily in
order to interfere with the members' franchise. An argument by
directors that they, rather than members, can best determine who
should lead the organization or have access to control over its
policies would fail to meet such a standard. Thus, this level of judicial
protection would make most directorial actions to prevent member
insurgency quite difficult to defend.

221. See id.at 663.
222. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) ("Blasius' burden of
demonstrating a 'compelling justification' is quite onerous, and is therefore applied rarely."). It
is worth noting that in several cases following Blasius, directors were able to avoid application
of the stringent compelling justification standard. See id. (finding no evidence that the board's
actions were taken for the primary purpose of impeding shareholder voting); Stroud v. Grace,
606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992) (finding the Blasius "compelling justification" standard
inapplicable where a majority of fully informed shareholders approved of the board's
challenged action). Thus, Blasius is only a model for an insurgent-protective standard to the
degree one believes it actually will be applied.
223. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 ("The shareholder franchise is the ideological
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests."); see also Stephen J.
Massey, ChancellorAllen's Jurisprudenceand the Theory of CorporateLaw, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L.
683, 734 (1992) (noting that the Delaware courts, guided primarily by Chancellor William T.
Allen of the Delaware Court of Chancery, have long been guided by the principle that "the
legitimacy of corporate law greatly depends on shareholders retaining an effective vote").
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Cases involving nonprofits also can provide examples of
insurgent-protective standards. In Fitzgerald v. National Rifle Ass'n
of America, Thomas Fitzgerald, an insurgent candidate, challenged
actions that the nonprofit National Rifle Association's incumbent
fiduciaries took to block him from access to the Association's
electoral machinery.2 24 It is unclear from the facts stated in the
opinion whether Fitzgerald's candidacy was part of a larger takeover
attempt or a single insurgent's desire to access the ballot. Whatever
the circumstances, the federal district court viewed the defendants'
actions as self-aggrandizing if not potentially disloyal. 22' Thus, it
reviewed the directors' actions under a strict standard drawn from
the duty of loyalty context and required them "not only to prove the
good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein., 226 The court defended this rigorous standard of review as
necessary to prevent corporate democracy from existing as a mere
"pious fraud[]" and to avoid "[c]orporate elections becom[ing]
hollow mockeries., 227 Applying this insurgent-protective standard to
defensive actions by nonprofit directors would focus directors on the
inherent conflict they face in a takeover situation and require them
to consider the impact of their actions on the entire organization.
Under such a standard, many defensive measures would be voided.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of insurgent-protective
standards like those employed in Blasius and Fitzgerald is their
strong support for the value of internal democracy. By limiting the
actions directors may take to thwart takeover activity, these standards
safeguard voting members' choice of how best to accomplish a
nonprofit's mission. These standards permit aspiring fiduciaries to
compete for the reins of a nonprofit, with members' votes
determining the outcome. Thereby, insurgent-protective standards
simultaneously rely upon and energize the democratic form of
governance that nonprofits with voting members have selected.
Insurgent-protective standards also support another important
nonprofit value: evolution. One of the major benefits of the
nonprofit sector is the ability of the sector as a whole, and individual
224. Fitzgerald v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 383 F. Supp. 162, 165-66 (D.N.J. 1974).
225. See id. at 166.
226. Id. (quoting In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256, 263
(N.D.N.Y. 1968)).
227. Id.
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groups within it, to innovate to meet changing societal problems and
challenges. 228 "Where business and government, science and
technology are active in the creation and testing of technological
innovations, the independent voluntary sector specializes in the
practical testing of social ideas., 229 This capacity for innovation is one
reason to encourage nonprofits' existence in society and serves as an
important justification for the many privileges they enjoy. However,
for the nonprofit sector to continue innovating, its organizations
often will need to evolve their focus over time.
Insurgent-protective standards of review allow for this kind of
evolution. An insurgent-protective standard will grant incumbents
only the narrowest reach to engage in defensive tactics on the level of
individual organizations. Consequently, a group of members seeking
to change the mission of a nonprofit often will be permitted to
pursue this mission change through an adjustment in board
personnel or membership composition. Thus, the existence of such
an insurgent-protective standard may hearten potential insurgent
innovators throughout the sector.
Yet insurgent-protective standards may go too far in supporting
internal democracy at the expense of other important nonprofit
values and constituencies. Recall that nonprofits are esteemed and
privileged in °~our society not only for innovation, but also for
preservation.0 Insurgent-protective standards encourage insurgent
groups to seize control of a nonprofit's leadership, after which they
will have the power to alter its mission, perhaps fundamentally. To
the extent that preserving original intent is a worthy goal for
nonprofits, insurgent-protective standards leave incumbents little
room to pursue it. Insurgent-protective standards can thereby put

228.

See COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY &

PUB. NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA:

TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 42-43 (1975) (discussing the important role of
nonprofits in "initiating new ideas and processes" and "developing public policy"); O'NEILL,
supra note 6, at 47 (noting the argument from political science theory that the nonprofit
sector exists, in part, as a fount for social experimentation and development); Douglas, supra
note 6, at 47-49 (noting one rationale put forward for the existence and benefits of the
nonprofit sector is its ability to experiment and innovate in ways the government and the
market can or will not); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 5, at 225-26 (arguing that
charitable trust fiduciaries have an obligation to "assure the trust is meeting contemporaneous
needs").
229. Smith, supra note 7, at 80.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
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the value of nonprofit organizations' names and goodwill at
substantial peril.
Finally, insurgent-protective standards will fail to consider and
protect the interests of other valuable stakeholders in a nonprofit's
mission. Nonprofits with members
also have important
constituencies in their directors and officers, staff, beneficiaries,
donors, and even in the public at large. Directors and officers,
obligated as fiduciaries to manage the operations of the organization
to serve its best interests, may be uniquely qualified to consider the
advisability of mission transformation. Staff, who work day-to-day in
the trenches of the organization's programs, and beneficiaries, who
receive its services, may be particularly well-positioned to evaluate its
strategy and performance for consistency with its mission. Donors
and the public, as direct and indirect supporters of the organization,
also have a stake in how its mission should be fulfilled. Of these
various groups, members may not always be appropriately singled
out for primacy in determining whether an insurgency interested in
shifting the mission should succeed. Highly insurgent-protective
standards place this issue solely in members' discretion and,
therefore, may go too far in pursuing the cause of internal nonprofit
democracy.
C. Intermediate Standards
A third option is for courts to adopt some intermediate standard
for reviewing the actions of nonprofit fiduciaries faced with takeover
activity. Such standards would slant neither in favor of incumbents
nor insurgents. They would impose some substantive review of
fiduciaries' actions in such situations, with a meaningful but
achievable burden either to challenge or defend them. Under such
review, one would expect courts to sustain some directors' actions to
hinder takeover activity and to strike down other such efforts. Both
specific and .general reasons favor the use of intermediate standards
in the nonprofit context.
Several of the justifications for intermediate standards result from
the specific situation of nonprofits that opt for member-elected
fiduciaries.2 3 ' The first of these arguments is structural. If nonprofits

231. These rationales for an intermediate approach to reviewing defensive tactics do not,
of their nature, generalize to nonprofits using self-perpetuating board structures. Yet, this
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are granted the choice by law to select a member-elected fiduciary
structure for their internal governance, it is fair to demand that this
structure be a legitimate choice rather than a sham. If a nonprofit
opts to allow its members to elect its fiduciaries, the members should
be empowered to do so. If incumbent directors are granted wide
discretion to frustrate the ability of insurgents to reach the ballot, the
power of members to elect representatives is illusory. A policy choice
has been made to allow nonprofits to offer their adherents internal
democracy; this choice should not be undermined by an overly
lenient review of defensive tactics.
An intermediate approach will aptly reflect the sharing of power
between electors and elected that a choice of member-elected
fiduciaries represents. If a nonprofit corporation opts for this
governance structure, its fiduciaries will not be permitted to act
omnipotently to limit the power and choices of its members. Rather,
defensive actions will be subject to real substantive scrutiny by a
reviewing court and sometimes will not be sustained. Likewise,
attempts at insurgency sometimes will succeed in avoiding or
overcoming defenses, demonstrating the power of the members to
select their nonprofit's leaders and to have input on the evolution of
its mission.
The second argument for an intermediate approach is related to
the structural argument and stems from the need to hold nonprofits
that choose member-elected fiduciaries to the rhetoric they often
employ about internal democracy. Of course, a nonprofit's mere
decision to adopt a membership governance structure implicitly
signals that organization's dedication to democracy. In addition, this
choice of structure often is accompanied by rhetoric explicitly
claiming this kind of commitment. Indeed, in the cases reviewed
here, the nonprofits' selection of member-elected fiduciaries was
accompanied by language in their organic documents and public
relations materials stating their fundamentally democratic nature. If
nonprofits use this kind of democracy-embracing rhetoric to
differentiate themselves from other organizations with similar
missions, at least some attempt should be made to hold them to
their word. An intermediate approach will require nonprofits with

limitation should not detract from the force of these arguments since the hostile takeover issue
will arise only in nonprofits with member-elected fiduciaries.
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member-elected boards that utilize this sort of rhetoric to be true to
it.
A third justification for an intermediate approach is even more
specific to the types of organizations that often select memberelected over self-perpetuating fiduciaries. Many of these nonprofit
organizations are engaged in political and social advocacy.2 3 2 As such,
they use their membership and their claimed accountability to their
members as political capital. The ability of these organizations'
leaders to point to thousands (or hundreds of thousands) of
members who elect them adds gravitas to their calls for legislative
action or for policy changes from government or the private sector.
These claims to an empowered constituency of supporters are
undermined if the incumbent leaders of the organization are able to
insulate themselves and their positions from those who would
advocate different policies. An intermediate approach will reinforce
the message of accountability touted by advocacy groups and their
leaders, and will make them accept its burdens as well as its benefits.
In addition to the justifications for an intermediate standard that
arise from the peculiar circumstances of nonprofits choosing
member-elected fiduciaries, a more general argument can be made in
favor of such an approach. Intermediate standards recognize and
attempt to harmonize the competing nonprofit values of mission
preservation and mission evolution.2 33 Incumbent- or insurgentprotective standards heavily favor one of these ideals over the other.
Incumbent-protective standards tilt in favor of maintaining a
nonprofit's original mission by protecting the desires and claims of
fiduciaries in office; however, they likewise work to stifle growth and
transformation of that mission over time. Insurgent-protective
standards lionize mission evolution but simultaneously may fail to
protect the intent of donors and other stakeholders in serving the
nonprofit's original mission. Because they do not consistently bias
toward one potential control group or the other, intermediate
standards can be used to balance both the nonprofit sector's

232. See Panepento, supra note 42, at 33 (reporting the differences among membership
criteria in many advocacy groups and describing the importance of membership figures in,
inter alia, maintaining such groups' credibility in lobbying efforts).
233. Cf Brody, supra note 5, at 483 (describing a parallel conflict in the cy pres context,
between those who endorse a restrictive cy pres regime because it avoids "unfettered discretion
by current trustees" and "those who believe, like Thomas Jefferson, that 'the land belongs to
the living"').
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rectitude for preserving original intent and the value in allowing
nonprofit purpose to evolve in order to meet society's changing
needs. They can put a brake on mission change without wholly
foreclosing it and thereby force valuable incrementalism, which may
be a good example for answering the larger questions about mission
change in the nonprofit sector.
D. Articulatingan IntermediateStandard
Despite these benefits, intermediate standards do not offer the
level of predictability that standards with either a clear incumbentprotective or insurgent-protective bias provide. Thus, in crafting
such a standard, it is important to identify clear signposts to guide
the courts and to enable fiduciaries and insurgents to forecast how
particular defensive actions will be reviewed. Moreover, these criteria
should attempt to distinguish between constructive efforts at mission
evolution and damaging attempts to dismantle valuable nonprofit
enterprises.
1. A for-profit adaptation
An intermediate standard of review might be borrowed from the
for-profit context, where the Unocal standard was developed to
reconcile competing concerns in the context of tender offers.234 In
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum2 3 and its progeny, the Delaware courts
adopted a multipart standard to review the actions of incumbent
directors who implement takeover defenses.2 36 First, directors must
show that their actions are taken in response to a reasonably
perceived threat.2" 7 Next, the directors hold the burden of proving
that their responses are reasonable or proportional in light of this

234. The Delaware Supreme Court first recognized that review of takeover defenses
required a standard less deferential than that used in duty of care cases and yet less rigid than
the searing inquiry triggered by the duty of loyalty in Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del.
1964). The Court later articulated a more detailed intermediate standard in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). For a brief explanation of the competing
policy interests and historical trends that culminated in the Delaware courts' articulation of the
Unocal standard of review, see CLARK, supra note 15, at 584-85.
235. 493 A.2d at 946.
236. See id. at 955-58; Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1366-67 (Del.
1995) (elaborating upon the Unocal standard); see also AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (applying the Unocal standard).
237. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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threat.238 If the directors satisfy these two prongs, the courts apply
the deferential business judgment rule standard of review. Courts
will enjoin the defense only if the complaining shareholders can show
that the directors failed to inform themselves, engaged in fraud, or
lacked good faith; the substance of the transaction will not be further
scrutinized.2" 9 On the other hand, if the directors cannot show they
responded to a reasonably perceived threat in a proportional manner,
their actions likely will be enjoined.
One could simply transfer this approach as a standard of review
for nonprofit fiduciaries defending against hostile takeover
activities. 24" To qualify for the business judgment rule's protection,
incumbent fiduciaries could be required to prove that they acted in
response to a reasonably perceived threat to their organization and
that any steps they took were proportional. If they could not meet
this burden, their actions would be deemed to breach fiduciary
obligations. However, for-profit cases employing Unocal's standard
can look to the economics of deals to determine the threat that offers
pose and the reasonableness of directors' defensive actions. Without
the easy and singular metric of dollars, it would be difficult to follow
the precedents of Unocal's progeny in the nonprofit context.
Of course, one could take the lesson of Unocal more generally
and demand that nonprofit directors responding to a takeover
attempt defend their organizations in a proportional manner. Hefty
defensive measures could be sustained only in circumstances where
takeover activity posed a particularly serious threat. This standard,
however, might offer less guidance to incumbent directors,
insurgents, and their supporters than is desirable. Courts would need
to examine the facts and circumstances of individual cases to
238. Id. ("If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment
rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed."). Years later, the Delaware courts
answered the question of what defensive measures would fail the proportionality requirement
of the Unocal standard of review. Defensive measures that have the effect of either coercing
shareholders or precluding them from exercising their vote would be deemed draconian and
therefore would be unreasonable (or disproportionate) per se. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1377.
239. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958 ("[U]nless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that the directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetuating themselves in office, or some
other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being
uninformed, a Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board.").
240. One commentator already has called for application of a subset of for-profit
corporate takeover law-so-called Revlon duties-to boards of directors of nonprofits
approving conversion transactions. See Colin T. Moran, Why Revlon Applies to Nonprofit
Corporations,53 Bus. LAW. 373 (1998).
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determine their consistency with a generalized proportionality
approach.
Even if Unocal could be translated to the nonprofit environment,
one must consider whether it should be adapted to this new context.
This consideration should turn on whether the standard is designed
to prevent the kinds of damage that nonprofit takeover activity
threatens. In the for-profit sector, the Unocal standard guards
against the twin perils that for-profit takeovers threaten to produce.
On the one hand, for-profit acquirers may be energetic reformers
intending to run the target and deploy its assets more effectively than
current management, offering gains to the corporate entity. Under
these circumstances, managerial overreaching is the threat posed by
takeovers, as incumbents' defensive measures may be solely an
expression of their base desire to perpetuate themselves in office. On
the other hand, a for-profit takeover attempt may be the tool of an
aggressive acquirer interested solely in deriving short-term value
from a takeover transaction, regardless of the harm it will work on
shareholders and other constituencies in the long run. In such
situations, takeover transactions threaten legitimate corporate
interests, and defensive measures may be warranted to protect
corporate assets and shareholders. By requiring incumbent directors
to demonstrate the threat posed by insurgents and the proportional
nature of their responses, Unocals standard attempts to strike down
defensive measures that represent managerial overreaching while
permitting those measures that protect shareholder value. Thus, the
claimed benefit of the for-profit market for corporate controlgreater managerial efficiency through fear of takeovers-remains
within reach.
The risks and benefits of nonprofit takeover activity, however,
differ substantially from those in the for-profit context. Unlike in forprofit takeovers, managerial efficiency gains cannot reasonably be
241
expected as a by-product of contests for nonprofit control.
Conducting a takeover of a nonprofit, after all, requires significant
resources of time, expertise, and money. In contrast to the for-profit
sector, where there are potentially immense profits to be gained for
the leaders of successful takeover attempts, leaders of nonprofit
241. This is not to say that managerial efficiency is not a problem in nonprofit
organizations. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that nonprofit takeover attempts are sufficiently
rare that they will fail to serve as an effective deterrent against potential malfeasance by
nonprofit fiduciaries.
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takeovers must be satisfied with more psychic returns for their
investments. While there are certainly those who, due to strongly
held beliefs, will be willing to put their energies and personal
fortunes into the process of attempting to acquire control of a
nonprofit, such individuals are outside the norm. Individuals
dissatisfied with their organizations' policies and programs are much
more likely to take the cheaper and easier route of resigning and
perhaps joining an alternative organization more closely aligned to
their views. Furthermore, these contests for control-at least the
hostile takeover activities discussed here-can only occur within a
relatively small subset of nonprofits: those with member-elected
fiduciaries. Since most nonprofits opt instead for self-perpetuating
boards, hostile takeover attempts will not be a reliable means to
correct excesses by nonprofit managers.
For these reasons, managerial efficiency simply is not a realistic
goal of judicial limitations on defensive measures by nonprofit
fiduciaries. Adopting the Unocal standard, which serves this end,
would therefore be inappropriate.
2. A nonprofit-specific approach:The governance-protectivestandard
An intermediate standard unique to the nonprofit sector can be
crafted to better reflect and react to the distinctive concerns raised by
nonprofit takeovers. Here, the goal is not optimal promotion of
managerial efficiency, but optimal allocation of power over mission
in a nonprofit with voting members. The governance-protective
standard will pursue this end.
In a nonprofit with voting members, it seems fitting that
members should have some voice in how the organization's mission
is defined, particularly when a conflict over mission arises in the
context of a contested election or in a fight over access to
membership itself. Yet members are far from all-powerful in
nonprofit governance-even in nonprofits with member-elected
fiduciaries. As infrequent contributors to the project of nonprofit
management and governance, they may lack information, expertise,
and perspective that fiduciaries, employees, or even beneficiaries may
possess. Moreover, depending on the threshold requirements for
membership, members may lack the level of dedication to the
organization demonstrated by these other constituencies. The
governance-protective standard will empower and count on
members' voting rights when they are effective, but it also will
1248

11811

Nonprofit Takeovers

leverage the skill and commitment of fiduciaries when member
voting will be ineffectual to safeguard the nonprofit enterprise. To
strike this balance, the governance-protective standard differentiates
between defensive actions taken in response to takeover techniques
of persuasion versus techniques of purchase, rigorously reviewing the
former while deferring to the latter.
Again, persuasive tactics try to convince the target nonprofit's
members that the insurgents' vision of the organization is superior to
that of the incumbents. The most sweeping persuasive tactic is a
contest to obtain a majority of an organization's fiduciary positions.
But insurgents also may look for members' support in more
incremental contexts. They may seek members' votes to obtain
fiduciary representation short of a majority. They may urge members
to permit or refuse some action or transaction upon which members
must vote. Or they may merely advocate that the membership pass
or reject resolutions expressing a sense that certain organizational
activities or policies should be undertaken or halted. In each of these
situations, insurgents look to a group empowered by the nonprofit's
governance structure-its members-to arbitrate the policy
differences insurgents have with the current board. Moreover, they
ask members to play this role using their constitutive voting rights.
Courts should encourage this process of self-regulation of mission.
Thus, if insurgents are able to demonstrate that the tactics
directors seek to defend against are persuasive, defensive reactions
should be reviewed scrupulously. Directors in this situation should
be able to engage in persuasion of their own, acting within the
organization's election and membership rules to make their case to
the membership. Attempts to block insurgents' access to the
members or to frustrate members' ability to vote, however, rarely
should be tolerated. As such, a court should undertake an
independent review of incumbents' decision to engage in such
defenses and their means of doing so. Only if this independent
review determines that the board's actions are--despite their
interference with the members' role-in the best interests of the
organization should they be permitted to stand.242
242. If the defendants' actions in Fitzgerald were a defensive response to takeover
activity, the court's denunciation of them can be seen as an application of this type of standard.
The directors in that case refused to run Fitzgerald's advertisement of his candidacy in The
American Rifleman, an NRA publication used to inform voting members of candidates for the
Club's board of directors. Fitzgerald v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 383 F. Supp. 162, 163-64
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The burden the governance-protective standard imposes on
fiduciaries defending against persuasive takeover tactics is not
intended to be entirely insurmountable, but it should be difficult for
incumbents to meet. Defensive actions might be found to meet this
rigorous test if they were necessary to prevent conversion of the
organization's assets by insurgents or to protect non-member
constituencies, but only if these goals are deemed by the court more
important than members' desire for change and members cannot be
counted on to weigh appropriately the needs of the organization's
various stakeholders. If subjected to the governance-protective
standard of review, the Sierra Club board's defensive reactions to the
persuasive tactics of SUSPS likely would not have passed muster.
On the other hand, the governance-protective standard would
grant greater latitude to nonprofit directors defending against
takeover tactics that rely on the power of purchase. Recall that such
tactics utilize the device of swelling membership ranks with new
members in an attempt ultimately to shift the weight of the group's
preferences in favor of insurgents' positions. This technique is
facilitated by the often easy route to membership, requiring a
contribution alone or coupled with generic support for an
organization's aims. Once accomplished, a newly reconstituted
membership will have the power to call on incumbents to change
their policies to those favored by the insurgency, to support
transactions or resolutions in keeping with insurgent positions, or to
vote in insurgent candidates to replace incumbent fiduciaries. Rather
than relying on the membership governance structure to arbitrate
their policy differences with incumbents, insurgents using purchase
tactics seek to go around the members-or at least sufficiently dilute
their power-to dominate fiduciaries in office. Here, the governance
alternative represented by the membership structure breaks down,
and the board should be afforded greater freedom to protect the
nonprofit and all of the stakeholders in its mission.24 3
(D.N.J. 1974). Thus, Fitzgerald desired to use a tactic of persuasion. By assigning the
defendants the burden of proof and holding them to the standard of "fairness from the
viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein," id. at 166 (citation omitted), the
court engaged in a rigorous review of the defensive measures and their impact on the
organization and its stakeholders.
243. Applying a more stringent standard of review to defenses against purchase tactics
than that advocated here would risk discouraging the use of membership governance structures
altogether. If directors knew that their defenses to takeover activity pursued through purchase
would be enjoined, more nonprofits might opt out of voting membership governance

1250

11811

Nonprofit Takeovers

Thus, courts considering the defensive actions of nonprofit
fiduciaries faced with purchase-oriented takeover tactics should treat
those actions more deferentially. Fiduciaries' actions still must
comply with the election or membership rules articulated by their
organic documents. Assuming they do so, defensive moves to
prevent purchase tactics should be upheld so long as they are
rationally connected to protecting the interests of existing members.
If the membership's role in governance can be reinvigorated, then a
dialogue on the policy issues dividing the incumbents and insurgents
can go forward, and mission can, in many cases, be self-regulated.
Directors should be permitted to take on this role only when
members cannot be counted upon to guard the organization's
mission and multiple stakeholders. 2
Subjecting the RSPCA's response to CAWG's purchase tactics to
the governance-protective standard of review likely would not have
changed the outcome in that case. The Council, being able to state a
rationale for its decision to exclude and remove pro-hunting
applicants and members, would prevail in a challenge to its
Membership Policy. And, its failure to comply with internal
membership rules would have doomed its proposed Membership
Scheme. Still, had the court articulated the governance -protective
standard's nuanced approach to reviewing nonprofit fiduciaries'
responses to takeover activity, it would have offered greater guidance
to groups faced with a range of takeover tactics in the future.

structures (or make the path to membership even more difficult than is often the case today) as
a means to avoid the possibility of takeover by purchase. The governance -protective standard
of review recommended here could provide reassurance to directors that while a membership
governance structure does demand commitment to a real measure of internal democracy, it
does not necessarily leave the organization's door open to any well-funded raider.
244. The governance-protective standard can also be seen to track freedom of association
rights relevant in this context. By rigorously reviewing defensive measures taken in response to
persuasive takeover activity, courts are enforcing the associational bargain between incumbent
fiduciaries and the membership. See Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The
Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 821, 900 (2002).
When insurgents employ purchase tactics, however, deferential review of defenses is
appropriate to permit associations to define and limit their membership in order to control the
organization's expression. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). Of
course, current freedom of association jurisprudence, especially as represented by the Boy Scouts
case, has been challenged. One particularly relevant critique charges that the legal regime it
imposes acts to thwart valuable cultural dissent. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54
STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001).
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Of course, persuasive and purchase tactics, and the defenses
erected against them, may appear together. Courts should, however,
do their best to distinguish the two types of takeover activity and
apply the differential strands of the governance-protective standard
to them, as described above. Doing so will encourage memberelected fiduciaries to engage with insurgents on the ultimate
question of organizational mission and will encourage organizations
to identify their members with care and precision, as members often
will be the arbiters of how mission can and should change.
V. CONCLUSION

The offhand comment, and lament, has often been made that
nonprofits are not subject to takeovers.24 5 This Article takes issue
with such conventional wisdom. Takeover activity can be found in
the nonprofit sector. By necessity, it occurs by mechanisms different
than the persuasion or purchase of a working majority of equity
shares as seen in for-profit corporations. It also may not occur as
frequently without the easy currency of shares to lubricate the
takeover machinery. Furthermore, as defined here, nonprofit
takeover activity can occur only in a limited type of nonprofitsthose that opt to have member-elected fiduciaries. Court challenges
to defensive tactics in response to this activity will occur only rarely.
Yet, takeover attempts do take place, and crafting a response to
these high stakes conflicts reminds us of the centrality of mission and
the complexities created by the multiple stakeholders in nonprofit
organizations. Thus, it is worthwhile to explore the nonprofit
takeover phenomenon and to articulate the appropriate legal
standard to regulate it.
Nonprofit takeover activity highlights the tension between the
treasured nonprofit values of mission preservation and mission
evolution. An intermediate, governance-protective standard for
reviewing nonprofit takeover defenses most appropriately resolves
these tensions by channeling mission change through an
incremental, dialogic process. Moreover, in doing so, this standard
properly relies on the governance structure that nonprofits with
voting members have chosen. Finally, creating an ordered legal
framework for dealing with nonprofit takeover activity also provides

245.
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a partial answer to some of the most challenging and enduring
questions in nonprofit law and policy: who should be empowered to
change nonprofit mission, and how should they exercise this mission
control?
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